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Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers 
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and Robert H. Landettt 
When should the government challenge a merger that might increase 
market power but also generate efficiency gains? The dominant belief has 
been that the government and courts should evaluate these mergers solely 
in terms of economic efficiency. Congress, however, wanted the courts to 
stop any merger significantly likely to raise prices. Substantially likely effi-
ciency gains should therefore affect the legality of mergers to the extent 
that they are likely to prevent price increases. This standard is more strict 
than the economic efficiency criterion, because the latter would permit 
mergers substantially likely to lead to higher prices, if sufficient efficiency 
gains were substantially likely. 
The authors analyze the competing price effects of market power 
increases and efficiency gains in the most relevant context: significant 
mergers in concentrated markets-oligopoly. They derive four general oli-
gopoly models and evaluate them over all reasonable ranges for their 
underlying parameters. This methodology avoids biases due to overly 
restrictive assumptions. 
By using the Merger Guideline standards and data from mergers that 
the Federal Trade Commission closely examined during 1982-86, the 
authors analyze empirically relevant tradeoffs between market power 
increases and efficiency gains. They find that decreases in marginal costs 
of 0 to 9% could be necessary to prevent price gains from mergers typical 
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of those the government regularly evaluates. Cost savings in the upper por-
tions of this range are far larger than those that previous authors have 
suggested would be necessary to compensate for efficiency losses from most 
mergers. They are also far greater than efficiency gains that one could 
realistically predict from virtually any merger. Moreover, if a merger sig-
nificantly increased the probability of collusion, the required cost savings 
would be even greater. 
The authors' models and a large number of practical considerations 
suggest that implicit consideration of efficiency gains, through adjustment 
of the standards for horizontal mergers, would be better than an explicit 
case-by-case efficiency defense. 
I 
BALANCING MARKET POWER AND EFFICIENCY GAINS 
When should the government challenge a merger that might 
increase market power but also generate efficiency gains? The antitrust 
community continues to struggle for the optimal way to handle such 
mergers, which can arise from large combinations in concentrated mar-
kets--oligopoly. Controversy over proper treatment of these difficult 
mergers contrasts with general agreement over policy making for the 
majority of mergers. The enforcement agencies and courts permit most 
mergers, because they are unlikely to lessen competition substantially. 1 
The enforcement system also typically blocks mergers that seem likely to 
decrease competition substantially and unlikely to generate otherwise 
unavailable efficiency gains. 2 Large mergers in concentrated markets 
that promise significant efficiency gains, however, have long perplexed 
the antitrust enforcement system. 
The enforcement system's ability to evaluate these difficult mergers 
depends on three related factors: decision-making criteria, evaluative 
techniques, and workability. The enforcement system's decision-making 
I. The Clayton Act prohibits mergers whose effect "may be substantially to lessen 
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." Clayton Act § 7, IS U.S.C. § 18 (1982). Some 
representative statisties indicate how few mergers have this effect. Of the 868 filings made during 
1979 under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 [hereinafter Hart-Scott· 
Rodino Act], IS U.S.C. § !Sa (1982), the relatively interventionist Carter administration requested 
additional information ("second requests") for only 109 (12.6%) and challenged only 20 mergers 
(2.3%). The Federal Trade Commission, led by activist Chairman Michael Pertschuk, issued 58 
second requests, and the Department of Justice [hereinafter the Department] issued 51; each 
enforcement agency challenged 10 mergers. See P. Rodino, Rodino Announces Hearing on 
Antitrust Enforcement 3 (Mar. 2, 1988) (news release) (on file with the authors). 
2. When evaluating a proposed merger, antitrust enforcement agencies should not consider as 
an offset potential efficiency gains that are speculative, unprovable, or attainable through less 
anticompetitive means. Economic efficiency occurs when there is no way to reallocate resources or 
goods to make any individual better off without making someone else worse off. Perfect competition 
in all markets ensures economic efficiency. See E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND 
APPLICATIONS 438-49 (4th ed. 1982). 
1989] PRICE EFFECTS OF MERGERS 779 
criteria must reflect the antimerger statutes' congressional mandate. The 
enforcement system must also use some coherent technique to balance 
the procompetitive (efficiency) and anticompetitive (market power) 
effects of mergers. And the system must be workable-that is, it must 
produce comprehensible and predictable decisions. 
The Reagan administration's sole criterion for its merger policy was 
usually to maximize economic efficiency.3 Under this criterion, market 
power is undesirable only because it increases allocative inefficiency;4 
wealth transfers are irrelevant. A merger that improved economic effi-
ciency would therefore be beneficial even if it led to higher consumer 
3. Former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Charles F. Rule stated that "all too 
often" those who would include values other than efficiency in antitrust are engaging in 
"demagoguery." C. Rule, Antitrust, Consumers and Small Business I (Nov. 13, 1987) (remarks at 
the 21st New England Antitrust Conference, Harvard Law School) (on file with the authors). 
Former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust J. Paul McGrath stated that the primary goal of 
the Division during his and William F. Baxter's tenures was "to reinforce the notion that the sole 
basis of antitrust enforcement should be that decisions should be based on economic efficiency 
notions •.•• " 60 Minutes with J. Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, 54 
ANTITRUST L.J. 129, 131 (1985) (statement of J. Paul McGrath) [hereinafter McGrath Statement]; 
see also [FTC Commissioner] Calvani, Consumer Welfare Is Prime Objective of Antitrust, Legal 
Times, Dec. 24/31, 1984, at 14, col. 1; Baxter, Responding to the Reaction: The Draftsman's View, 71 
CALIF. L. REV. 618, 619-20 (1983) [hereinafter Draftsman's View]; Baxter, Separation of Powers, 
Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Common Law" Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 
692-94 (1982). 
However, the administration has in practice sometimes used or advocated a price standard. For 
example, Daniel Oliver, while Federal Trade Commission chairman, described the Commission's 
method of analyzing mergers: "[T]he crucial question is whether such transactions will substantially 
lessen competition-and hence injure consumers-by increasing price or reducing output." 60 
Minutes with Daniel Oliver, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, 57 ANTITRUST LJ. 235, 237 
(1988), (statement of Chairmau Oliver) [hereinafter Oliver]. For other examples, see infra notes 50-
51, 110. 
4. To raise prices, firms with market power reduce output below the competitive level. The 
goods no longer sold would have been worth more to would-be purchasers than they would have 
cost society to produce. The difference between the maximum amount that consumers would have 
paid and the amount they actually pay is consumers' surplus. E. MANSFIELD, supra note 2, at 95. 
This foregone production of goods worth more than their cost constitutes lost consumers' surplus, a 
pure social loss that economists call a deadweight loss, or the a/locative inefficiency from market 
power. For example, suppose that wickets cost $1 in a competitive market and that we define cost to 
include a normal profit. Suppose that a firm with market power would sell them for $1.25 each. A 
potential purchaser who would have been willing to pay up to $1.15 would not pay $1.25 for wickets. 
Since a competitive market would have enabled her to purchase wickets for less than they were 
worth to her, the reduced production in the market has decreased the consumer's satisfaction 
without producing any countervailing benefits for anyone. For an extended discussion and a formal 
proof that prices greater than the competitive price generate allocative inefficiency, see id. at 277-92; 
see also infra Figure 1 and text accompanying notes 40-43. 
Higher prices transfer wealth from consumers to firms with market power. The difference 
between the actual price and the minimum amount that firms would require to keep them in 
production (full economic cost, including a normal rate of return on time and invested capital) is 
producers' surplus. Market power transforms consumers' surplus into producers' surplus. However, 
because of allocative inefficiency, the loss in consumers' surplus always exceeds the gain in 
producers' surplus. See E. MANSFIELD, supra note 2, at 290-92. 
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prices and transferred wealth from consumers to firms with market 
power. 
Even if one assumed that economic efficiency should be the sole cri-
terion to judge mergers, one would still face the technical question of 
how large efficiency gains would need to be to compensate for market 
power increases, either in individual mergers or in general. 5 To our 
knowledge, the Reagan administration did not present its opinion, and 
the antitrust literature has widely different recommendations. 6 
Whatever the technical determination of the extent of efficiency 
gains necessary to offset increased market power, antitrust policy must be 
workable. The antitrust enforcers' decisions must be objective, coherent, 
and predictable. Ideally, the rules should be clear enough that business 
managers and government officials would know with a high degree of 
certainty which proposed mergers would be permitted and which would 
fail. 
Virtually every current resolution of the market power/efficiency 
tradeoff follows in part from two basic assumptions: that economic effi-
ciency should be the sole goal of antitrust enforcement/ and that it is the 
only workable standard. 8 We dispute both contentions. 
We believe that Congress passed the antitrust statutes primarily to 
5. Scholars typically use Williamson's formulation to phrase the question: By what 
percentage must costs decrease to compensate for expected allocative inefficiency from market power 
effects? See Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeojfs, 58 AM. EcoN. 
REv. 18, 22-23, 34 (1968). Antitrust scholars have differed widely in the amount of efficiency gains 
that they consider necessary to compensate for most allocative inefficiency effects. For example, 
Muris would require an efficiency gain of one to two percent. Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381, 420 (1980). Areeda and Turner would 
require an increase of five percent. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, 4 ANTITRUST LAW~ 946e (1980). 
The specific tradeoff values are highly sensitive to details of the modeling, even under the simplest 
assumptions. Fisher & Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 
1580, 1630-44, 1668-69 (1983). 
6. See supra note 5; see also Edwards, Joffe, Kolasky, McGowan, Mendez-Penate, Ordover, 
Prager, Solomon & Toepke, Proposed Revisions of the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines, 8 I 
COLUM. L. REV. 1543 (1981). 
7. Those who believe that economic efficiency was the sole concern of the authors of the 
antitrust statutes typically rely on Judge Robert Bark's analysis of the legislative history of these 
statutes. Judge Bork argues that the sole goal of antitrust enforcement should be to ensure that 
productive efficiency mitigates any allocative inefficiency from enhanced market power and resulting 
higher prices. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & EcoN. 7 (1966); 
see a/so R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 50-71, 91 (1978). We disagree with Judge Bork. 
8. The sole exception is the Guidelines of the National Association of Attorneys General, 
which follow our suggested approach: "When a firm or firms exercise market power by profitably 
maintaining prices above competitive levels for a significant period of time, a transfer of wealth from 
consumers to those firms occurs. This transfer of wealth is the major evil sought to be addressed by 
section 7." National Association of Attorneys General, Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the 
National Association of Attorneys General [hereinafter NAAG Guidelines], reprinted itz 52 
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1306, Special Supp. at S-4 (Mar. 12, 1987) (footnotes 
omitted). 
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prevent firms from acquiring the ability to raise prices and thereby 
extract wealth from consumers.9 Congress wanted to block any merger 
significantly likely to generate higher consumer prices; it did not focus 
directly on efficiency consequences. 10 This price standard is virtually 
equivalent to one that proscribes anticompetitive restrictions in output. 11 
Advocates of economic efficiency as the sole criterion of antitrust 
enforcement might challenge our wealth transfer (price) approach as 
unworkable. For example, former Assistant Attorney General Baxter 
compared an economic efficiency standard to "social and political stari-
dards .... stated in vague, subjective tenns" 12 and concluded that "eco-
nomic efficiency provides the only workable standard from which to 
derive operational rules and by which the effectiveness of such rules can 
be judged!'13 But this comparison ignores the price standard. Had Bax-
ter compared the efficiency standard to a price standard, he should have 
reached a different conclusion. Our modeling demonstrates that in the 
relevant context for mergers-oligopoly-it is actually far easier to solve 
the market power/efficiency tradeoff for a price than an economic effi-
ciency standard. 14 
Current antitrust enforcement also raises a difficult technical prob-
lem. Mergers likely to increase both market power and productive effi-
ciency have an uncertain effect on price. Increased market power by 
9. See infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text. 
10. Congress did not oppose efficiency, but it was more concerned with preventing higher 
prices. For example, suppose that a proposed merger would probably increase market power and 
generate merger-specific cost savings, but the net effect would be to increase prices. The merger, if 
allowed, would enrich the merging firms but make consumers worse off. Our analysis suggests that 
the legislators who voted for the Celler-Kefauver Amendment, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 
(1950) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (1982 and Supp. V 1987)), and the Clayton Act, 
Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§52, 53 and scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C. (1982 and Supp. V 1987)), would have wanted to stop such a 
merger. 
11. The output and price standards are identical except when demand is completely 
unresponsive to small changes in price or when firms are able to practice certain forms of price 
discrimination. 
This interpretation harmonizes the antimerger statutes with the Sherman Act's prohibition 
against anticompetitive "restraint[s] of trade." 15 U.S.C. §I (1982). A practice that "restrains" 
trade is essentially one that restrains (reduces) output. 
12. Baxter, Draftsman's View, supra note 3 at 621. "[C]ourts are not, I believe, entitled to 
balance such things as consumer welfare against small business welfare without engaging in a task 
that is so unconfinedly legislative as to be unconstitutional." Bork, The Role of the Courts in 
Applying Economics, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 21, 24 (1985). The debates over workability have ignored 
the price standard. Bork, Baxter, et a!. have instead convincingly demonstrated that an antitrust 
standard based on "big is bad, small is good" or other similar platitudes is unworkable. See R. 
BORK, supra note 7. 
13. Baxter, Draftsman's View, supra note 3, at 621; see also Calvani, supra note 3. 
14. See infra notes 107-126 and accompanying text (section V.A). However, Judges Posner 
and Easterbrook, generally associated with the efficiency school, recommend an output standard 
(essentially a price standard) for workability reasons. See infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
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itself tends to raise prices. 15 But all firms base their prices in part on 
their costs, so improved productive efficiency tends to lower prices. 16 
How extensive must these efficiency gains be to offset the price effects of 
increased market power in a concentrated market? 
In this article, we provide the first response both grounded in eco-
nomic theory and based on the most relevant market context. We focus 
on price, not economic efficiency, as the appropriate criterion-or legal 
standard-by which the government and courts should evaluate pro-
posed mergers: We focus on oligopoly, because we assume that there 
would be no merger enforcement in unconcentrated markets and that the 
antitrust agencies and courts would be unlikely to permit mergers 
expected to lead to monopoly or to an effective cartel. 17 The enforcement 
agencies typically focus their policy analysis on intermediate situations 
similar to those that we evaluate. 
The market power/efficiency tradeoff usually occurs in large merg-
ers in concentrated markets that would result in neither a complete 
monopoly nor perfect collusion-in other words, oligopoly. Existing 
analyses, however, either assume an initial increase in price without 
explaining why mergers are likely to generate such large price increases 
or assume transformation of an initially competitive market to a monop-
olistic or perfectly collusive one. 18 Moreover, because they do not con-
sider data from the proposed mergers that enforcers and the courts 
actually evaluate, their conclusions may not be reliable. 
To simulate the tradeoff without limiting the analysis by misleading 
assumptions, we use "theoretically neutral" assumptions to model the 
simultaneous effects of market power and efficiency in oligopoly. We use 
the latest standards of the Merger Guidelines and recent data on actual 
proposed mergers to define the critical parameters of our models. Our 
realistic model building and use of relevant data enable us to identify the 
15. See E. MANSFIELD, supra note 2, at 277-92; see generally J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 113-24 {2d ed. 1968) (in a competitive market, no one firm can affect price; in 
oligopoly, each seller supplies a large enough share of industry output to affect price). 
16. See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text. 
17. An efficiency standard, however, might permit some mergers likely to result in higher, even 
monopolistic, prices. For an analysis of the price effects of merger leading to monopoly, see Fisher, 
Lande & Vandaele, Afterword; Could a Merger Lead to Both a Monopoly and a Lower Price?, 71 
CALIF. L. REV. 1697 {1983). 
The Commission explicitly considered whether to accept a negotiated consent in a merger that 
both the Bureau of Competition and the Bureau of Economics agreed would probably improve net 
economic efficiency but could result in higher, or perhaps even monopolistic, prices. The 
Commission voted three to one to accept the consent; Chairman Miller cast the only opposing vote, 
because he considered monopoly overcharges "revenue transfers" that should not factor into the 
enforcement analysis. In re Allied Corp., FfC File No. 811-0191 (Dec. 8, 1982), discussed in Cost-
Benefit Analysis, Miller Style, FfC: Watch {Wash. Reg. Rep. Assoc.) No. 158, at I (Jan. 14, 1983). 
18. For a critical discussion of the existing studies, see Fisher & Lande, supra note 5, at 1624-
50. 
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extent of efficiency gains necessary to justify mergers that firms routinely 
propose. 19 
But should courts and antitrust enforcers perform the market 
power/efficiency tradeoff on a case-by-case basis or on average, through 
merger guidelines? Merger guidelines implement the market power/effi-
ciency balancing through structural "safe harbors" and presumptions of 
varying strengths that allow most merger-specific efficiency gains and 
prevent most adverse market power effects. While a guideline approach 
has almost universal approval, there is wide disagreement over treatment 
of mergers with significantly likely market power and efficiency effects. 
The most individualistic approach would be to perform a case-by-case 
tradeoff between increases in market power and gains in efficiency. The 
opposite extreme would be to incorporate the tradeoff implicitly by rais-
ing the structural threshold for illegality instead of allowing a case-by-
case efficiency defense. The greater one's confidence in the abilities of 
business executives, government officials, and courts to perform the bal-
ancing accurately (and reach consistent conclusions) in individual 
merger cases, the stronger the argument for case-by-case evaluation.20 
Antitrust enforcers during the Reagan administration tried various 
approaches to handle the market power/efficiency tradeoff. In the 1982 
Merger Guidelines, the Department of Justice essentially followed the 
recommendations of Judges Bork, Posner, and Easterbrook and rejected 
a case-by-case efficiency defense "[e]xcept in extraordinary cases."21 The 
Federal Trade Commission, in its Statement on Horizontal Mergers, 
adopted a similar approach.22 The administration soon changed its pol-
icy. The Department's 1984 Merger Guidelines proposed considering 
virtually all kinds of efficiency gains without explaining how it would do 
I 9. All predictions of either market power or efficiency gains are probabilities, not certainties, 
and one should discount the calculations appropriately. 
20. For an extensive discussion and the argument that the case-by-case approach is 
unmanageable in practice, see Fisher & Lande, supra note 5, at 1670-77. 
21. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines § V.A, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493, 28,501 (1982), 
reprinted in 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 11 4501, 11 4505 (Aug. 9, 1982) [hereinafter 1982 Merger 
Guidelines]. For the recommendations of Judges Bork, Posner, and Easterbrook, see e.g., R. 
POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 
463-64, 920-21 (2d ed. 1981) ("But is an efficiencies defense manageable? For the reasons discussed 
in the previous note, the defense could bog down litigation for years .... The effort seems unlikely to 
be worth the candle." /d. at 920-21); see also R. BoRK, supra note 7, at 125-27; R. POSNER, 
ANTITRUST LAW: AN EcONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 112-13 (1976). 
22. Federal Trade Commission, Statement on Horizontal Mergers, June 14, 1982, 11 4516, at 
6901-5, reprinted in 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 4516, at 6901-5 (Sept. 10. 1984) [hereinafter FTC 
Statement]. For a demonstration that the practical effects of the 1982 Merger Guidelines and the 
FTC Statement should have been very similar, if followed, see Fisher & Lande, supra note 5, at 1661 
n.279, 1666-67. Chairman Miller disagreed with the Commission's statement, however, and would 
have considered scale-type efficiency gains in the legal analysis of individual cases. See FTC 
Statement, supra, at 6901-5 n.22. The Chairman's views soon became the majority position at the 
Commission. See infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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so, 23 and the Commission argued at length that it was appropriate to 
consider anticipated efficiency gains in individual cases. 24 The Reagan 
23. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984), 
reprinted in 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 655 1!1! 4490-4495 (June 18, 1984) (hereinafter 1984 
Merger Guidelines]. We use "Merger Guidelines" when a statement applies equally to the 1984 
Merger Guidelines, id., and the 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 21. The Justice Department 
would like to limit consideration of efficiency gains to the discretion of prosecutors. See 1984 
Merger Guidelines, supra, at § 3.5; c.f. Conference Board Seminar's Faculty Takes Cautious 
Approach to Enforcement Outlook, 56 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1406, at 355 (Mar. 9, 
1989) [hereinafter Conference Board Seminar] (remarks of Judge Easterbrook, commenting on the 
Reagan administration's internal evaluation practices). This policy, however, may not be viable in 
the long run. If the enforcers did not accept an acquiring firm's efficiency claims, the company 
would probably bring its efficiency claims before a court and argue that the court was equally or 
better qualified to evaluate them. Some courts would probably agree. 
If the Justice Department and Commission follow the evidentiary standards in the 1984 Merger 
Guidelines and the FTC Statement, an efficiency defense should virtually never succeed; compare the 
1984 Merger Guidelines, id., with the language quoted and discussed in Fisher & Lande, supra note 
5, at 1665 n.279, 1666-67. Interpretation of the language, however, may vary between the agencies 
and over time. See infra notes 24, 79. 
Professor Jorde concluded that this change in the 1984 Merger Guidelines constitutes "double 
counting" of efficiency gains. The 1982 Merger Guidelines broadened the definition of "relevant 
market" and raised the permissible level of market concentration to account for most efficiency 
gains. By keeping this higher threshold and adding consideration of efficiency gains in individual 
cases, the Department has given efficiency too much weight, according to Jorde. See Jorde, Coping 
With the Merger Guidelines and the Government's "Fix-It First" Approach: A Modest Appeal for 
More Information, 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 579, 591 {1987). 
Judge Stephen G. Breyer recently commented that the merger guidelines have moved 
enforcement toward a "kitchen sink" standard where "everything is relevant" and away from the 
"bright line" process. Noted practitioner Ira M. Millstein complained that the Reagan 
administration used a secret, "unpublished" set of merger guidelines under which the Antitrust 
Division did not explain its decisions to permit many above-Guideline mergers, other than the 
ambiguous "prosecutorial discretion." Judge Breyer and Mr. Millstein made their remarks at the 
Conference Board's 28th annual Antitrust Issues in Today's Economy seminar on March 2, 1989. 
For a report on the conference that includes a discussion of Breyer's and Millstein's remarks, see 
Conference Board Seminar, supra, at 355. 
24. In re American Medical Int'l, Inc., 104 F.T.C. I, 213-20 (1984). In this opinion, where the 
Commission first directly addressed the proper treatment of the market power/efficiency tradeoff, 
the Commission ignored its own Merger Statement, see supra note 22, and examined the specific 
tradeoff between increased market power and efficiency gains. Since the Commission found no likely 
efficiency gain for the merger in question, American Medical International's extensive discussion in 
dicta of the legitimacy of a case-by-case efficiency defense seems to be an attempt to change policy. 
Internal merger analyses at both the Commission and Department now routinely evaluate efficiency 
claims. 
Former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust (now Judge) Douglas H. Ginsburg concluded 
from personal observation that an efficiency defense would rarely be successful: 
Under the Merger Modernization Act [of 1986], an efficiency-enhancing but price-
increasing merger could be interdicted. As a matter of enforcement discretion, however, I 
would have been unlikely, as Assistant Attorney General, to have opposed a merger that 
was demonstrably efficient. At the same time, I hasten to point out, however, that I did not 
find the efficiencies claim persuasive in any of the admittedly few merger reviews where the 
point was argued .... 
. . . Particularly in view of the infrequency with which efficiency showings can 
convincingly be made on behalf of a proposed merger, a price-driven standard for mergers 
would do more to avoid lost efficiencies through over-enforcement (of the Von's Brown, or 
PNB sort) than could possibly be lost by the occasional blocking of a merger that would be 
both price and efficiency enhancing. 
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administration even tried to codify the case-by-case efficiency defense by 
amending Section 7 of the Clayton Act.25 The National Association of 
Attorneys General has suggested a middle ground: consider efficiency 
gains only for mergers of modest size in moderately concentrated mar-
kets but not for mergers in markets more concentrated than the highest 
structural benchmarks in the Merger Guidelines. 26 
Resolving this question requires an understanding of how difficult it 
is to balance changes in market power and efficiency. Even under a price 
standard, the increase in efficiency needed to balance market power and 
thus justify an above-Guideline merger is quite sensitive to the underly-
ing assumptions. When one broadens the analysis to include qualitative 
efficiency gains, the analysis becomes vastly more difficult. The complex-
ities of an accurate case-by-case efficiency defense lead us to conclude 
that whether one adopts a price or an efficiency standard, an individual 
case approach is too complex for the courts and antitrust enforcers. The 
best way to incorporate efficiency is therefore through merger guidelines 
that incorporate efficiency through threshold values, rather than guide-
lines that permit a case-by-case efficiency defense. 
II 
THE INTENT OF CoNGRESS: PRICE VERSUS ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
Most leading scholars who have analyzed the legislative history of 
the antimerger laws have concluded that the primary concern of Con-
gress was that mergers might enable businesses to restrict output and 
Letter from Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg to Robert H. Lande (Feb. 3, 1988); but see infra note 69 
(the staff attorneys or economists at the Federal Trade Commission advised the Commission in 19 of 
70 above·Guideline mergers during June, 1982 to December, 1986 that they believed that the merger 
in question would be likely to generate significant efficiency gains). 
25. The Reagan Administration tried several times to amend the Clayton Act. For the 1984 
efforts, see Commerce Department is Examining Ways to Permit Mergers Yielding Efficiencies, 47 
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1185, at 655 (Oct. 11, 1984). For the 1986 efforts, see infra 
note 110 and accompanying text. For the substantially identical 1987 efforts, see Antitrust, 
Intellectual Property Reform Are Features of Competitiveness Package, 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 1303, at 328:1 (Feb. 19, 1987). A logical impetus behind the proposals to amend 
the merger standards could have been that Supreme Court and appellate court decisions, although 
somewhat old, seemed to disfavor the efficiency defense to anticipated increases in market power. 
Compare Fisher & Lande, supra note 5, at 1593-99 (The Supreme Court held in 1967 that an 
efficiency defense was not available under section 7 of the Clayton Act; however, the availability of 
the defense under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act remains an open question. 
Further, courts today might rule differently given the increased recognition of the importance of 
efficiency gains from mergers.) with In re American Medical Int'l Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1, 215-19 (1984) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court has stated in dicta a bias against an efficiency defense in merger 
cases, but that the Court has sometimes been willing to consider evidence of efficiency gains 
favorably in other antitrust contexts). See also infra note 130. 
26. NAAG Guidelines, supra note 8, at S-9. 
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raise prices.27 The dispute centers on which effect of higher prices Con-
gress believed caused harm. 28 Some scholars identify allocative ineffi-
ciency as the component of concern to Congress;29 we, however, agree 
with other analyses that point to wealth transfers as the primary issue. 30 
27. As Bork stated so eloquently, "The touchstone of illegality is raising prices to consumers. 
There were no exceptions." Bork, supra note 7, at 16. Bork also stated that the "rule against 
monopolistic mergers ... [was] derived in large·measure from a desire to protect consumers from 
monopoly extortion. . . . Where producer and consumer welfare might come into conflict, . . . 
Congress chose consumer welfare as decisive." I d. at 1 I. While Bork wrote in the context of the 
Sherman Act's legislative history, his summary aptly describes the congressional intent in passing 
the antimerger laws as well; see also R. PosNER, supra note 21, at 23 ("The framers of the Sherman 
Act appear to have been concerned mainly with the price and output consequences of monopolies 
and cartels .... "); AREEDA & KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES~ 133 
(4th ed. 1988) (using an output test as :l "first and generally decisive test," except when the market 
power transfers wealth from consumers to producers). For additional examples, see sources that we 
cite infra at note 30. For further discussion, see Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and 
Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged. 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 126-
42 (1982). 
There are a few exceptions, who focus on socio-political values. See, e.g., Bok, Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 233-238 (1960) 
(Congress' main concern was a wide range of sociological problems associated with mergers and big 
business); see also Lande, supra, at 69 nn.ll-16, for additional citations. 
28. Congress simply wanted to prevent price rises resulting from mergers; ascertaining which 
of the effects of higher prices concerned Congress most is less important. However, to determine 
when a merger is likely to lead to higher prices, we must disaggregate efficiency and wealth-transfer 
effects. 
29. See, e.g., R. BoRK, supra note 7, at 91; R. PosNER, supra note 21, at 8-22. Bork's position 
seems inconsistent. See supra note 27. It is hard to believe that "monopoly extortion" means 
nothing more than allocative inefficiency. 
Judge Easterbrook has long advocated an efficiency standard for the antitrust laws. See, e.g .. 
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1984). His position might be 
starting to evolve. He recently concluded that when Congress enacted the Sherman Act, "The 
choice they saw was between leaving consumers at the mercy of trusts and authorizing the judges to 
protect consumers. However you slice the legislative history, the dominant theme is the protection 
of consumers from overcharges." Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 
1702-03 (1986). Easterbrook then asserted: "This turns out to be the same program as one based on 
'efficiency.' There are differences at the margins ... but the differences are not very important ... 
[especially because] [i]n the long run consumers gain most from a policy that emphasizes allocative 
and productive efficiency." Id. at 1703. Easterbrook thus appears to concede that the primary 
purpose of the antitrust laws is to prevent consumers from paying higher prices, but he seems to 
argue that the price standard is virtually the same as an efficiency standard. 
30. See, e.g., Kaplow, The Accuracy of Traditional Market Power Analysis and a Direct 
Adjustment Alternative, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1817, 1822-23 (1982) (Congress was concerned with 
wealth transfers from consumers to dominant firms); Scherer, The Posnerian Harvest: Separating 
Wheat/rom Chaff (Book Review), 86 YALE L.J. 974, 979 (1977) (reviewing R. PosNER, supra note 
21, and arguing that Congress was concerned at least as much with distributional effects as with 
efficiency); Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 
1146-55 (1981) (one purpose of the antitrust laws was to stop wealth transfers from consumers and 
small suppliers to trusts); Hovenkamp, Alltitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 250-53 
(1985) (Congress was "really concerned with protecting consumers from unfavorable wealth 
transfers." Id. at 250.); Harris & Sullivan, Horizontal Merger Policy: Promoting Competition and 
American Competitiveness, 31 ANTITRUST BuLL. 871, 897 (1984) ("protecting consumers from 
exploitation and loss of income to producers" were Congress' objectives); Wiley, Antitrust and Core 
Theory, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 556, 587-88 (1987) (Congress cared more about distributive justice than 
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The legislators' principal concern was whether mergers would 
enable firms to raise prices and thereby unfairly transfer wealth from 
consumers (purchasers) to producers (sellers)Y Most supporters of the 
Celler-Kefauver Amendment considered the main economic issue to be 
the possibility of firms with market power victimizing consumers. 32 The 
opponents saw no substantial risk of such "unfairness," even without leg-
islation. 33 Some legislators expressed concern about the possible effects 
of the legislation on the productive efficiency of firms, but none of them 
explicitly recognized any tradeoff between losses to consumers through 
economic efficiency); Kovacic, Public Choice and the Public Interest: Federal Trade Commission 
Antitrust Enforcement During the Reagan Administration, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 467, 477-78 11.18 
(1988) ("distributional concerns, not allocative efficiency, led Congress to pass [the antitrust 
statutes]"); see also AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 27. 
More generally, Nobel Laureate George Stigler argues that policy makers concentrate on 
wealth transfers and not on efficiency. See Stigler, Economists and Public Policy, 6 REG. May-June 
1982, at 13. 
31. The most logical explanation of congressional intent is that in passing the antitrust Jaws 
Congress defined certain property rights or entitlements for the first time. In effect, Congress 
attempted to guarantee consumers the right to purchase competitively priced goods by declaring that 
consumers' surplus was the property of consumers. Congress condemned any mergers substantially 
likely to lead to supracompetitive pricing that would "unfairly" transfer this property to firms with 
market power. For an explanation of the concepts of consumers' and producers' surplus, see supra 
note 4. Its concern was not the distribution of wealth between the rich and the poor; Congress dealt 
here only with the more limited issue of the fair distribution of consumers' surplus between sellers 
and buyers. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 5, at 1588-93. The most faithful way to implement this 
concern is to prevent mergers substantially likely to lead to higher prices or reduced output. 
32. For example, Rep. Bennett wanted legislation to protect "the consuming public from 
unfair exploitation." 95 CoNG. REc. 11,506 (1949). Rep. Carroll accused certain companies of 
"maintaining high prices which injure the consumer," id. at 11,492, and called monopoly prices 
"outrageous prices," id.; see also id. at 11,492-94. Rep. Byrne quoted (with apparent approval) from 
an FTC report that stated: " '[U)nder competitive capitalism consumers are protected from high 
prices by the constant rivalry among numerous firms for a greater share of the market.' " Id. at 
11,506 (quoting Federal Trade Commission, The Merger Movement: A Summary Report 68 
(1948)). Rep. Patman complained: "You know what a monopoly always does. It will do what is in 
the best interest of the people who own the monopoly." Id. at 7989. Sen. Kilgore wanted to protect 
"consumers" and "buyers" against "unjust exploitation." Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions: 
Hearings on H.R. 2734 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 8Jst Cong., 1st & 
2d Sess. 180 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; see also 95 CoNG. REc. 11,493 (1949) 
(statement of Rep. Yates). 
Similar statements permeate the Clayton Act's legislative history. Rep. Hamlin expressed his 
distaste for monopoly pricing in these terms: 
The only reason why trusts and combinations are declared illegal is because they are 
organized and operated for the express purpose of ... more effectively exploiting the people 
by taking advantage of their necessities and controlling the price of these necessities to the 
consumers, as well as the purchase price which they have to pay for the raw material. 
51 CONG REC. 9556 (1914); see also id. at 9265 (statement of Rep. Morgan); id. at 14,223 (statement 
of Rep. Thompson). 
33. Rep. Jennings, for example, stated that the merger amendment was unnecessary: "I do not 
subscribe to the doctrine that the businessmen of our country are crooks and that those who carry on 
their business through the instrumentality of corporations are out to fleece and extort higher and 
higher prices from their customers." 95 CoNG. REC. 11,490-91 (1949); see also Senate Hearings, 
supra note 32, at 308 (testimony of James L. Donnelly); id. at 251 (testimony of Benjamin C. 
Marsh). · -~ - ~ 
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wealth transfers and gains to society through efficiency. Proponents of 
the antimerger statutes argued that monopolies would not increase pro-
ductive efficiency, 34 and opponents felt that mergers would improve effi-
ciency but not increase market power. 35 
Moreover, Congress was surely unaware of even an intuitive version 
of the concept of allocative inefficiency in 1914 when it approved the 
Clayton Act;36 the notion that this concept could have caused Congress 
to pass the antimerger laws is hardly credible. 37 Although economists 
had dramatically increased their understanding of allocative efficiency by 
1950 when Congress enacted the Celler-Kafauver Amendment,38 the leg-
islative history of this bill contains absolutely no mention of this 
concept.39 
Figure 1 contrasts the effects of the efficiency and price standards for 
34. For example, Rep. Celler stated: "Bigness does not mean efficiency, a better product, or 
lower prices." 95 CoNG. REC. 11,486 (1949); see also 95 CoNG. REC. 11,495-98 (1949) (statement of 
Rep. Boggs) (quoting Judge Learned Hand); Senate Hearings, supra note 32, at 308; Amendi11g 
Sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act: Hearings on H.R. 988, H.R. 1240, H.R. 2006, and H.R. 2734 
Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 8Ist Cong., 1st Sess. 83-84 (1949) 
(statement of John M. Blair, Assistant Chief Economist, FTC) [hereinafter House Hearings]. 
Economists today would interpret a change in "productive efficiency" as a change in costs. See 
Fisher & Lande, supra note 5, at 1599-604. The majority in Congress felt that mergers would reduce 
competition and lead to inefficient, lazy monopolists-what economists would now call x· 
inefficiency. The majority view, then, was that increased competition (disallowing mergers that 
might threaten competition) would mean lower, not higher, costs! Id. at 1599-604. 
35. For example, Rep. Goodwin stated: 
By preventing harmless and reasonable mergers among small and medium-sized concerns, 
this bill ... will foreclose the chance that they may by consolidation or acquisition ever 
approximate either the size or the efficiency that the big competitors have already achieved. 
Thus we will hurt small business and help big business. 
95 CONG. REC. 11,487 (1949); see also Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 206 (statement of George 
S. Eaton, Executive Secretary, National Tool and Die Manufacturers Association); House Hearings, 
supra note 34, at 45 (statement of Gilbert Montague, attorney, New York, N.Y.); id. at 83 (statement 
of Robert E. McMath, Vice President, Bethlehem Steel Corp., Bethlehem, Pa.). 
36. Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 53 and 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C. (1982 and Supp. V 1987)). 
37. See Lande, supra note 27, at 109, 128, 133-34; Scherer, supra note 30, at 977 n.20; cf 
Stigler, The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly, 72 AMER. EcON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 1 
(1982) (explaining the views of economists when Congress passed the antitrust acts). 
Nobel Laureate Paul Samuelson reflected on the state of knowledge of the evil of prices above 
the competitive level (where price equals marginal cost) in the economics profession during the mid-
1930s, before pathbreaking work by the late Abba P. Lerner: "I can testify that no one at Chicago or 
Harvard could tell me in 1935 exactly why P=MC was a good thing, and I was a persistent 
Diogenes." Samuelson, A.P. Lerner at Sixty, 31 REV. EcoN. STUD. 169, 173 (1964). 
38. Celler-Kefauver Amendment, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (1982 and Supp. V 1987)). 
39. Our search of the legislative histories of the Clayton Act and Celler-Kefauver Amendment 
revealed neither explicit nor implicit evidence of a congressional concern with allocative inefficiency 
arising from monopoly pricing. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 5, at 1589-90; Lande, supra note 27, 
at 130-42. Nor have scholars advocating a strong efficiency orientation to the legislation produced 
such evidence. See, e.g., Muris, supra note 5, at 393-402 (arguing that the absenee of such evidence 
does not mean that Congress intended to exclude any concern with efficiency). 
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evaluating a merger.40 Assume a merger that simultaneously increases 
both market power and efficiency. Enhanced market power enables firms 
to raise prices from P1 to P2 despite lower marginal costs.41 Area C 
shows the efficiency gain, the reduced cost of producing quantity Q2• 
Area S shows a wealth transfer from consumers to firms that acquire 
market power from the merger. The loss to consumers, however, is the 
sum of areas S and D. The consumers' loss of S is obvious; what the 
consumers lose the sellers gain. 
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Area D, the allocative inefficiency, is less obvious. For all quantities 
between Q2 and Qh consumers would be willing to pay more than the 
cost to society of the inputs used to produce the product. However, 
because the sellers would have to lower their prices on all units, including 
those they could have sold for a higher price, it is unprofitable for them 
40. Williamson, supra note 5, at 21, originated this diagram. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 5, 
at 1624-51, for a discussion of a host of ambiguities and qualifications to this simplified ("naive," to 
use Williamson's characterization) formulation of the tradeoff problem. Williamson, supra note 5, at 
21, assumed constant marginal cost (MC), and we maintain that assumption for consistency. The 
more general shape for MC, which we use in Figure 2, adds complexity that is not necessary to 
illustrate the basic tradeoff issues. 
41. A merger that helps a firm maintain its market share and supracompetitive prices may be 
objectionable even if it does not lead to higher prices. Krattenmaker, Lande & Salop, Monopoly 
Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241, 258 (1987). 
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to produce more than Q2• Because the loss to consumers (the sum of 
areas S and D) exceeds the gain to producers (area S), the difference, area 
D, is the deadweight loss to society from the reduced output. To the 
advocates of the economic efficiency criterion, allocative inefficiency 
(area D) is the only negative result from enhanced market power; wealth 
transfers (area S) are irrelevant.42 The economic efficiency criterion 
would permit a merger likely to result in higher prices if the expected 
efficiency gain, C, exceeded the anticipated deadweight loss, D.43 
The legislators who passed the antimerger statutes would have dis-
agreed with the economic efficiency approach. Congress wanted to pre-
vent price increases to supracompetitive levels. The legislators focused 
on area S. 44 They did not realize that area D existed, 45 and they either 
ignored area C or assumed that it would be of negligible size. 46 Rather 
than allowing price to rise to P2, as the economic efficiency criterion 
could do, a standard consistent with congressional intent would prohibit 
mergers in which price would be likely to rise above P 1•47 In short, a 
price standard would prohibit any merger substantially likely to induce a 
new wealth transfer from consumers to firms.48 
42. Cf. R. BORK, supra note 7, at 91 (1978). 
43. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 709 
(1977), argued that according to his simple model this burden would not be very heavy, because cost 
savings of 2% would offset market-power effects from the vast bulk of mergers that one might 
expect. For other assessments, see supra note 5. 
44. Economists define rent as all payments to inputs in excess of the minimum required to 
make them available to the industry or economy. See E. MANSFIELD, supra note 2, at 376-77. Since 
rents are in some sense excess payments, reductions in their value will not affect resource allocation. 
"Rent seeking" refers to the common tendency to fight over access to rents. Rent seeking could 
consume part or all of area S. If rent seeking wasted some or all of area S, price might have to fall 
before a merger would enhance efficiency. For classic discussions of rent seeking, see Posner, The 
Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. PoL. EcoN. 807 (1975); Tullock, The Welfare Costs 
of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 WEST. EcoN. J. 224 (1967). 
45. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, proper consideration of 
legislative intent includes analysis of "our best judgement as to what Congress would have wished if 
these problems had occurred to it." Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 
1975) (opinion of Judge Friendly), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). We must therefore ask what 
Congress would have done if it had known of the existence and importance of allocative efficiency. 
We believe that Congress would have included it as one of the factors in its analysis and that 
antitrust enforcers and courts should therefore do so as well. 
46. Most legislators could ignore area C because they thought that there was no tradeoff. They 
believed that costs would probably rise, not fall, if increased market power induced prices to rise. 
See supra text accompanying notes 34-36. 
47. One can characterize this standard either in terms of price (consumers' property rights) or 
output. If demand were completely inelastic within the relevant range, or if firms used certain kinds 
of price discrimination, however, price could increase to some consumers even though output 
remained constant. The wealth transfer or price label is therefore a somewhat more accurate 
characterization of congressional intent. 
48. Fisher & Lande, supra note 5, at 1587-98. A reasonable way to interpret the Justice 
Department's Merger Guidelines is to think of them as permitting a de minimis price increase of less 
than 5% (1982 Merger Guidelines) or a "small but significant and nontransitory" amount (1984 
Merger Guidelines), now generally reported to be 10%. See, e.g., Briggs, An Overview of Current 
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Agencies and courts should resolve the market power/ efficiency 
tradeoff according to the primary purpose of the antimerger laws. 49 
Thus, the proper formulation of the tradeoff is, "How much must margi-
nal cost decrease to offset a given increase in market power and ensure 
that price not increase?"50 Under this approach, efficiency gains would 
be relevant to the extent that one expected them to affect postmerger 
prices. By contrast, a standard based only on economic efficiency could 
allow substantial wealth transfers and understate the efficiency gains that 
Congress would have required to offset a given increase in market 
power.51 
Law and Policy Relating to Mergers and Acquisitions, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 657, 681 n.l (1987); 
Calkins, Developments in Merger Litigation: The Government Doesn't Always Win, 56 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 855, 857 n.9, 881 n.l25 (1987); Salop, Symposium on Mergers and Antitrust, 1 J. EcoN. PERSP. 
Fall 1987, at 3, 10; Yoerg, The Use of an Economist in a Contested Merger, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 789, 
790 (1987). One would like to investigate the percentage change in marginal cost necessary to ensure 
that price not rise by more than 5% or 10%. See Fisher, Lande & Vandaele, supra note 17 (in the 
context of competition to monopoly). We have not done so here, however, largely because it would 
be enormously complex to do so with our model. By focusing on equilibrium price and output and 
restricting the changes to keep the equilibrium values constant, we limit our examination to first-
order conditions for the merging firms. To consider a price increase would require solving the 
structural model for a new equilibrium, a task that in general would be very complex unless one 
made overly simplifying assumptions (such as constant marginal cost). 
We can, however, obtain an upward-bound .estimate of the percentage price increase that a 
merger could create if it did not lead to collusion. Assume that firms 1 and 2 merge and close down 
firm 1 completely. If none of the remaining firms respond by increasing output, then 
% increase in P = s1 I I1JI, where 
s1 is the pe~centage market share of firm 1, 0 .:5. s • .:5. 100, and 
lrJI is the absolute value of the elasticity of demand. · 
Thus, for example, with s1 of20% and lrll = 4, the most one could expect price to increase would be 
5%. In general, one would expect remaining firms to respond to a price increase by raising their 
outputs. Also, one would generally expect an acquiring firm not to eliminate the acquired firm's 
output completely. Both these factors would typically prevent price from increasing by anywhere 
near as much as the equation in this note suggests. However, if a merger increased the probability of 
successful collusion, that is if the remaining firms reacted to the merged firm's output restriction by 
reducing their outputs, the percentage increase in price could be greater. See infra notes 95-105 and 
accompanying text. 
49. Any standard must also be workable. See infra notes 107-126 and accompanying text. 
50. The Federal Trade Commission has adopted a similar standard on at least one occasion: 
Assuming that these cost savings can be realized, AMI does not establish that they will 
necessarily inure to the benefit of consumers; in fact, AMI's own economic expert has 
suggested the contrary. . •.. [I]t is unlikely that AMI can show that "market forces will 
oblige [AMI] to pass [cost saving efficiency gains] on to consumers." See L. SULLIVAN, 
ANTITRUST 631 (1977). 
In re American Medical Int'l, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1, 219-20 (1984) {alterations in original) (footnote 
omitted); see also Oliver, supra note 3, at .238-40 {claiming that the Commission uses a price 
standard). 
51. Although the top Reagan administration antitrust enforcers stated that they evaluated 
mergers solely on the basis of economic efficiency, in practice it was sometimes difficult to know 
whether they used economic efficiency or price. For example, the 1982 and 1984 Merger Guidelines 
both focus on the ability of an imaginary monopolist or cartel to impose a " 'small but significant 
and non transitory' increase in price" as the basis for market definition, entry barriers, collusion, and 
other factors in the analysis of a merger. To our knowledge, neither the Antitrust Division nor the 
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III 
EFFECTS OF EFFICIENCY GAINS ON PRICE 
Firms maximize profits by producing goods at the level of output 
where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Firms therefore increase 
their outputs and reduce their prices as efficiency gains lower their margi-
nal costs. 52 Some efficiency gains, however, reduce fixed costs, not short-
run marginal or variable costs. 53 Reductions in fixed costs lower a firm's 
total costs and increase its profits but change neither its marginal cost 
nor marginal revenue. For that reason, reductions in fixed costs in the 
short run neither lower prices for consumers nor induce firms to increase 
output. 54 Thus a merger that only reduces the combining firms' over-
head costs immediately benefits those firms, but not their customers. If 
merger policy focuses on price changes, efficiency gains that only affect 
fixed costs will seldom justify an otherwise anticompetitive merger. 
In contrast, efficiency gains that lower marginal costs immediately 
benefit consumers by encouraging firms to increase their rates of output 
and reduce their prices. These efficiency gains occur when the merging 
firms successfully combine the best attributes of each and thereby lower 
their marginal cost schedules. 55 We examine this type of efficiency more 
closely in our modeling. 
Commission has ever publicly stated that it had declined to challenge a particular merger, despite 
the expectation of higher prices, because of sufficient anticipated efficiency gains. Even if the 
Assistant Attorney General or the Federal Trade Commission decided not to challenge a particular 
merger on this basis, admitting so publicly would entail obvious political risks. 
52. If firms have any market power, they can sell more goods only by lowering their selling 
prices. If firms have no market power, they take prices as given and set their outputs where marginal 
revenue equals marginal cost. However, if enough firms in a competitive market become more 
efficient and expand their rates of output, total output will increase and price will fall. 
Mergers can also lead to inefficiency, which also has varying effects on final product prices. 
This inefficiency is usually unanticipated, so we cannot analyze its probable effect on prices, even in 
theory, except in hindsight. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 5, at 1599-1604, for a more extensive 
discussion of the efficiency and inefficiency effects of mergers. 
53. Some cost reductions to a firm are not legitimate efficiency gains since they are not resource 
savings but represent wealth transfers or contravene public policy. For this reason, we do not 
consider tax savings or evasion of regulations to be legitimate efficiency gains and therefore do not 
analyze them. 
54. See, e.g., C. BAIRD, PRICES AND MARKETS: MICROECONOMICS 74-79 (1975). In the short 
run, a firm equates short-run marginal cost with marginal revenue. In the long run, it equates long-
run marginal cost with marginal revenue. Reductions in fixed cost may reduce long-run marginal 
cost but do not affect short-run marginal cost. For that reason, fixed cost efficiency gains generally 
affect prices only indirectly. For example, a merger that lowered average cost three percent by 
reducing fixed cost would only affect output and pricing decisions indirectly, in the long run. 
55. Such a merger would decrease marginal cost for a given level and rate of output. See A. 
ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS ELEMENTS OF INQUIRY 255-78 (3d ed. 1972) 
(discussing the separate effects of rate and level of output on costs). The difference between a change 
in cost schedules and a movement along an unchanged cost schedule is analytically the same as the 
difference between a change in demand and a movement along an unchanged demand curve. See E. 
MANSFIELD, supra note 2, at 87 (explaining this distinction). 
A merger may create opportunities to increase efficiency by making organizational changes 
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Two other types of merger-specific efficiency gains can generate ben-
efits analogous to decreases in marginal costs. Rationalization of produc-
tion can allow the merged firm to produce the same amount at lower 
total cost by shifting output to the plant with the lower marginal costs. 56 
By shifting production among plants until it equalized marginal costs, a 
firm could lower overall costs even if the underlying marginal cost sched-
ules remained unchanged. 57 
Finally, a horizontal merger may enable a firm to achieve economies 
of scale without changing its marginal cost for a given rate and level of 
within the combined firm. See Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 
19 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1537 (1981). 
56. Further, if two firms perceived marginal cost differently (given imperfect information), 
they would not produce at the same marginal cost even if they perceived their marginal revenues to 
be the same. If the two firms merged and decided to produce the same level of output, they could do 
so at a lower total cost by shifting outputs between plants to equalize marginal costs. 
Under most oligopoly models, firms perceive different marginal revenue curves. Firms might 
face different marginal revenue curves because of differences in consumers' preferences for each's 
product. However, if the two products could be manufactured on the same equipment, the merged 
firm would still lower overall costs by rationalizing production, to equate marginal costs at the two 
facilities. 
57. Figure 2 demonstrates that any such efficiency gains would be small. Suppose that both of 
the merging firms faced the same marginal cost (MC) curve but that firm 1 had initially perceived a 
lower marginal revenue (MR) curve than had firm 2. As a consequence, firm 1 would have produced 
output x1 and firm 2, X2o where x. <x2• Rationalization of their joint output would require each to 
produce :X= {x1 + xz)/2. Firm l's costs would increase by area A; firm 2's would fall by area B. 
Area (B-A) approximates the net savings. The two firms' perceptions of marginal revenue would 
I 
D 
L 
L 
fA B 
X 
1 
FIGURE 2 
X 
z 
MC 
B - A 
aovlnga 
f'rcm having 
bot.h plcnt.a 
produc'" X 
794 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:777 
output. By combining production, firms whose levels of output would 
otherwise have been small in relation to minimum efficient scale can 
increase their overall level of output and thereby decrease marginal cost. 
Alternatively, multiproduct firms with large economies of scale in rela-
tion to demand may generate merger-specific savings by having each pre-
viously diversified plant specialize in part of the overall product line. 
Although we focus on downward shifts in an upward-rising marginal 
cost curve, scale economies are an equally valid benefit from merger. 58 
Our tradeoff calculations therefore apply to scale economies as well as to 
other types of efficiency gains that reduce marginal costs for a given rate 
and level of output. 59 
IV 
THE TRADEOFF IN VARIOUS TYPES OF MARKETS 
A. The Tradeoff Under Competition and Monopoly 
The tradeoff :between market power and efficiency obviously 
depends on the nature of and changes in market structure and behavior. 
The extreme situations are the easiest to describe, model, and evaluate. 
A merger in an industry with essentially competitive pricing usually 
leaves pricing unaffected. Thus, if a merger creates no exploitable mar-
ket power in an essentially competitive industry, there is neither a wealth 
transfer nor an allocative inefficiency cost. In such a case, there is no 
justification for challenging the merger under either a price or an effi-
ciency standard. The Department of Justice Merger Guidelines therefore 
probably not differ substantially, so any savings from rationalization would tend to be small. 
For example, suppose that firms I and 2 face the same MC curve but have different perceptions 
ofMR and thus have [output, MC) combinations of[x., MC.) and [x2, MCz]. Figure 2 reveals that 
the savings in total cost from output rationalization would approximate: 
Savings z 114•MC•x, 
where •MC = (MCz - MC1) and •x = (xz- x 1). Total cost is Average Total Cost (ATC) • x; if 
MC::=ATC, then MC • x approximates total cost. The ratio of cost savings to total cost is 
approximately: 
(114) Es (•MC/Mq2, 
where Es = (•xlx)I(•MC/Mq is the elasticity of the MC curve. Consequently, even a large 
difference between MC1 and MCz would generate very small cost savings from output 
rationalization. If, for example, MC2 exceeded MC. by 20%, the cost savings would be only I% for 
es=I. 
58. But exploitation of economies of scale may not always be convenient, at least in the short 
run. For example, if the plants of the merging firms were both too small to exploit economies of 
scale, the combined firm would need to replace the existing facilities with a new, larger facility to 
exploit scale economies. Moreover, merger is not always necessary or sufficient to exploit economies 
of scale. Unless brand preferences prevented it, one of the firms might have been able to expand on 
its own, without a merger, and force smaller, inefficient plants out of the market. Therefore, merger 
is not always necessary or sufficient to exploit economies of scale. 
59. We defer consideration of a fifth type of efficiency: improvement in quality or product 
variety for the same level of costs. See infra notes 116-127 and accompanying text. 
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state that the government is highly unlikely ever to challenge a merger 
that does not significantly alter the structure of an essentially competitive 
industry. 60 Indeed, the government has closely examined fewer than 
10% of all mergers reported under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act61 and 
challenged or negotiated restructurings in only a small proportion of 
those it has investigated. 62 
Conversely, challenge is obviously appropriate in the rare case when 
a merger would be likely to transform an industry from competitive to 
perfectly collusive (or monopolistic) pricing. This case assumes the max-
imum possible anticompetitive effect and therefore gives a maximum esti-
mate of the percentage reduction in marginal costs necessary to offset any 
possible increase in market power and keep price constant. The required 
cost reductions would be quite extreme, from 10% to 50%.63 
B. The Tradeoff Under Oligopoly: Decision Criteria 
and Economic Models 
Finns rarely propose mergers to monopoly since the government is 
virtually certain to challenge such mergers. 64 Enforcement therefore 
generally focuses on oligopolistic markets-those in which firms have 
large enough market shares to react to and affect each others' pricing and 
output decisions. In these markets, prices remain between the purely 
competitive and purely monopolistic levels. The difficult enforcement 
questions concern intermediate cases, where a merger may shift an indus-
try from competitive to oligopolistic or from one oligopolistic equilib-
rium to another. Here, balancing increased market power against 
increased efficiency is likely to be the most difficult. 
Unfortunately, economists disagree about how to model oligopoly, 65 
and different models predict widely divergent effects on prices for a given 
60. See, e.g., 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 23, at §§ 3.11, 3.3, and 1982 Merger 
Guidelines, supra note 21, at§§ lll(A)(1), lll(C), for two examples: unconcentrated markets and 
markets where entry conditions are easy. The Merger Guideline standards are below the levels at 
which researchers have frequently found significant anticompetitive effects. See generally Pautler, A 
Review of the Economic Basis for Broad-Based Horizontal Merger Policy, 28 ANTITRUST BULL. 571 
(1983). However, Congress also wanted to prevent price effects in their incipiency. See Fisher & 
Sciacca, An Economic Analysis of Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy, 6 RES. L. & EcoN. 1, 47-48 
(1984). 
61. Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1982). 
62. For a discussion of the number of Hart-Scott-Rodino filings, requests for additional 
information, and government challenges or induced restructurings in recent years, see Jorde, supra 
note 23, at 592 n.40; see also supra note 1. 
63. See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text. 
64. See supra note 17. 
65. For example, Scherer devotes four chapters and more than 100 pages to a discussion of 
different models of oligopoly behavior. F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND 
EcONOMIC PERFORMANCE 151-266 (2d ed. 1980). 
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structural change (change in market parameters).66 Even if economists 
could agree on a single model, they would rarely know the correct 
parameter values for a given market. Relatively small changes in the 
underlying assumptions or in values of important economic or psycho-
logical parameters can change the predictions substantially. Moreover, 
there is no direct and well accepted link between concentration levels and 
changes and the likelihood of a market experiencing interdependent (but 
noncooperative) or collusive oligopolistic pricing.67 Given the inability 
of economists to predict market power effects of mergers accurately, we 
obviously cannot estimate precisely how great efficiency gains would 
have to be to offset the effects from any given merger. 
Professor Oliver Williamson's pathbreaking analysis of efficiency 
and market power effects provided a framework for all subsequent analy-
ses of the percentage by which costs must decrease to compensate for 
expected allocative inefficiency from market power effects. 68 Our 
approach differs from Williamson's in two important respects. While 
Williamson only considered economic efficiency,69 our criterion is that 
the efficiency gain be sufficient to prevent price from rising and thus out-
put from falling. Also, Williamson's approach, and the tradeoff calcula-
tions attributed to it, assume implicitly that efficiency gains would reduce 
marginal costs for all firms in the industry, not only for the merging 
parties. 70 We explicitly differentiate the effects of marginal and fixed cost 
efficiency gains and whenever possible assume that any efficiency gains 
accrue only to the merging firms. 
Our analysis also assumes that premerger prices are at the competi-
tive level. When the premerger price is supracompetitive, the analysis 
becomes much more complex. 71 
66. For example, theoretical models generally predict a gradual increase in market power and 
thus in price as the number of firms decreases or concentration increases. Some empirical studies, in 
contrast, tentatively suggest a range of essentially competitive pricing followed by an abrupt increase 
to essentially monopolistic pricing. L. FOURAKER & S. SIEGEL, BARGAINING BEHAVIOR (1961); 
Dolbcar, Lave, Bowman, Lieberman, Prescott, Rueter & Sherman, Collusion in Oligopoly: An 
Experimellt 011 the Effect of Numbers and Information, 82 Q.J. EcoN. 240 ( 1968); K woka, The Effect 
of Market Share Distribution 011 Industry Performance, 61 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 101 (1979); Kwoka 
& Ravenscraft, Cooperation vs. Rivalry: Price-Cost Margins by Line of Business, 53 ECONOMICA 351 
(1986). 
67. For an extensive compilation of the evidence on the relationship between concentration 
and profits, and the meaning of this evidence for merger policy, sec Pautler, supra note 60. 
68. Williamson, supra note 5. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 5, for a detailed discussion of 
Williamson's analysis and the subsequent literature. 
69. See supra note 5. 
70. Fisher & Lande, supra note 5, at 1627 n.l75. Williamson recognized this problem and 
proposed a weighting adjustment to account for differences in the percentages of the industry subjcet 
to the price and cost changes. See Williamson, supra note 5, at 27. However, authors of 
mathematical solutions to the tradeoff have not taken this subtlety into account. For a discussion of 
these studies, see Fisher & Lande, supra note 5, at 1624-50. 
71. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 5, at 1627 n. 175, 1640 n. 208, 1641 n. 209, 1642 n. 212. 
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Appendix A explains in detail the oligopoly models that we sketch 
and summarize here. We initially assume that firms operate indepen-
dently-i.e., without colluding.72 The use of a price standard simplifies 
the modeling, because we need compare only equilibrium situations at an 
unchanged output (since price does not change). Because we only 
examine conditions at an equilibrium output level, we do not need 
restrictive assumptions about the shapes of the cost and demand curves, 
as we would if we were examining behavior under the economic effi-
ciency criterion (where output and price change).73 
C. Oligopoly: A Range of Possibilities 
The market power effects of a merger in oligopoly depend on the 
firms' subjective evaluations of how other firms would react to changes in 
their prices and outputs ("conjectural variations"), the market shares of 
the merging firms, and the elasticity of demand. 
1. Conjectural Variations 
Conjectural variations have two components: specific assumptions 74 
about the nature of each firm's conjectures, and a modeF5 of how each 
firm's conjectures change in response to a merger. Most oligopoly mod-
els place restrictive and frequently unjustified limitations on the values of 
their parameters (such as conjectural variations and elasticity of demand) 
72. We relax this assumption infra at notes 95-105 and accompanying text. 
73. To use an economic efficiency criterion, one must examine the effects of changes in prices 
and output levels. Such model building would be vastly more complex than model building for an 
unchanged output and would also require restrictive (perhaps unrealistic) assumptions of the 
behavior of marginal cost and marginal revenue as output changes. This complexity underlies our 
finding that the price criterion is simpler and more workable than the economic efficiency standard 
in the context of oligopoly. 
74. A common approach to oligopoly model building is to specify certain assumptions, usually 
Cournot. Coumot assumptions are the least competitive among noncooperative oligopoly 
assumptions. All oligopoly assumptions that are less competitive than Coumot involve some degree 
of cooperation-collusion-among firms. Under Coumot assumptions, each firm predicts that its 
rivals would not replace any shortfall in its production (that is, rivals would not react to any changes 
in its output). Competitive assumptions are the opposite (that is, the most competitive): each firm 
predicts that its rivals would replace all shortfalls. Under intermediate noncooperative oligopoly 
assumptions, each firm predicts that its rivals would replace some but not all of its decrease in 
output. Since Coumot assumes a particular value for each firm's prediction of its rivals' response, it 
is a special case of a more general oligopolistic treatment, discussed infra at text following note 76. 
For an example that treats collusive behavior in a similar way, see J. Kwoka, The Private 
Profitability of Horizontal Mergers with Non-Coumot and Maverick Behavior (1989) (Unpublished 
manuscript, George Washington University) (on file with the authors). 
75. "Model" might have two distinct meanings: the nature of firms' conjectures or the way 
their conjectures change in response to a merger. We use "assumptions" to refer to the first meaning 
and "model" to describe the second. We use "model building" to describe the entire process of 
developing integrated models and assumptions to describe a market. 
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to make the computations more manageable. These restrictive assump-
tions can generate misleading estimates of the tradeoff between market 
power and efficiency gains.76 To minimize this source ofbias, we develop 
an approach that provides the most general expression of how extensive 
efficiency gains must be to prevent mergers from leading to higher prices. 
We investigate four plausible models of the effects of merger on conjec-
tural variations and then simulate the reaction of the market over the full 
reasonable range of conjectural variations, from competitive to 
Coumot. 77 Since our model building does not rely on any single theory 
of oligopoly but embraces the full range of noncooperative oligopoly 
behavior, we call our treatment "theoretically neutral." The price of this 
neutrality is answers that are less precise, but more plausible, than those 
that models with highly restrictive assumptions would generate. 
2. Market Concentration 
The relevant range for market concentration/levels is that for which 
a case-by-case efficiency defense could determine the ultimate legality of 
a merger. The Merger Guidelines express concern only for relatively 
large mergers in markets that the Department defines as moderately or 
highly concentrated. The Department uses the Herfindahl-Herschman 
Index (HHI) to measure market concentration and defines an industry as 
moderately concentrated if its HHI is between 1000 and 1800 and highly 
concentrated if its HHI exceeds 1800.78 We therefore surveyed all pro-
posed horizontal mergers with a postmerger HHI in exces~ of 1000 for 
76. For example, one noted authority said of Cournot, supra note 74: 
One of the most telling criticisms of Cournot's analysis has been that his players learn very 
slowly. At each stage they change their own allocations assuming the opponent will not 
change his; and at each stage their assumptions prove wrong because every change 
provokes an answer. A satisfactory theory should respond to this charge, for if the 
equilibrium point (x*, y*) is to be regarded as the solution of something, it should result 
from some more enlightened behavior on the players' parts than an infinite sequence of bad 
guesses! 
J. CASE, EcONOMICS AND THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 30 (1979) (endnote omitted). Case contin-
ues with additional criticisms of Cournot assumptions. /d. at 30-31. 
77. Our four models assume respectively that conjectures do not change, that they change in 
proportion to the portion of the market that the firm does not control, that they change in 
proportion to market concentration, and that they change as the number of firms changes. For 
details, see Appendix A. 
78. One calculates the HHI by summing the squares of the individual market shares of all the 
firms in the market. See, e.g., F. SCHERER, supra note 65, at 58. Since economists, including 
Scherer, calculate the HHI as ranging between 0 and 1.0, they implicitly use fractional market 
shares. The Justice Department, however, interprets market shares as percentages ranging from 0 to 
100, drops the decimal, and defines the HHI range as 0 to 10,000. This stylistic difference does not 
affect the interpretation of the HHI. 
For highly concentrated industries (those defined as having a postmerger HHI of more than 
1800), the Department ignores mergers causing a change in the HHI of SO points or less; for 
moderately concentrated industries (those defined as having a HHI of 1000 to 1800 postmerger), the 
trigger is a change of 100 points. The trigger points indicate when the Department is likely to 
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which the Federal Trade Commission requested additional information 
under the Hart-Scott-Rodino provisions during the period June 14, 1982 
(when the Reagan administration issued its first Merger Guidelines) 
through the end of 1986.79 We then selected the HHI values for the 
nineteen of these proposed mergers for which the staff of at least one of 
the Commission's bureaus believed that efficiency gains would be reason-
ably likely. 
Table 1 summarizes the data for this group of mergers. The data 
demonstrate that the enforcement agencies frequently evaluate mergers 
with projected HHI changes of several hundred and that changes of 500 
to 1000 or more are reasonably common. 80 Based on these data, we 
challenge a merger, in the absence of other factors indicating that the merger is unlikely to have 
anticompetitive effects. See 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 23, at § 3.11; 1982 Merger 
Guidelines, supra note 21, at § III.A.l. Recent enforcement standards are probably more lenient 
than those in the Merger Guidelines. See infra notes 80, 135. 
79. In 9 of the 19 mergers, the staffs of both the Bureau of Competition (attorneys) and the 
Bureau of Economics (economists) found the efficiency arguments convincing; in the remaining 10, 
the staff of only one of the bureaus found the arguments convincing. The data set consists of 70 of 
the 76 horizontal mergers and joint ventures during the period for which the Commission issued 
requests for detailed information ("second requests") under the Hart-Scott-Rodino provisions. We 
excluded only the 3 joint ventures and 3 mergers in which the staffs of both bureaus predicted that 
the postmerger HHI would be less than 1000. We thank Malcolm Coate for making available the 
data set that he compiled for the Commission. 
Staff memos do not always distinguish savings in marginal costs from decreases in fixed costs 
when discussing anticipated efficiency gains. Nor do they always follow the Merger Guidelines, 
which require "clear and convincing evidence" that the anticipated efficiency gains would be likely. 
See 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 23, at § V.A.; 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 21, at 
§ 3.5. In addition, the memos seem inconsistent in,their searches for less anticompetitive methods to 
achieve the desired cost savings. 
Our focus on efficiency gains and HHis is obviously incomplete. For example, some markets 
with high HHI levels and changes did not present any anticompetitive problem because of easy entry 
conditions. For that reason, prospective efficiency gains probably determined the outcomes of 
proposed mergers in fewer than ten of the instances in this sample. The Commission challenged 
many but not all of the 19 mergers in our sample. To protect the confidentiality of the Commission's 
decision process, we do not report the number of challenges. 
80. Publicly available data for 31 markets in 22 recent mergers, as reported in Briggs, supra 
note 48, at 713-29, show a similar pattern. Among mergers that the Commission evaluated, the 
postmerger HHI ranged from 1166 to 8000+, with a mean of 4311 and a median of 3500. The 
change in the HHI ranged from 0 to 3900+, with a mean of 1246 and a median of 825. Among 
mergers that the Department of Justice evaluated, the postmerger HHI ranged from a low of 1747 to 
a high of 9856, with a mean of 4354 and a median of 3579. The change in the HHI ranged from 240 
to 3977 with a mean of 1175 and a median of 900+. Since concentration data generally become 
publicly available only when an agency challenges a merger, the markets in this sample are probably 
not representative of those affected by mergers that the agencies evaluate closely (that is, issue a 
"second request" for information under the Hart-Scott-Rodino provisions; see supra note 79). 
Moreover, we do not know which of these mergers included credible claims of merger-specific 
efficiency gains. 
In tabulating the Briggs data, we made conservative approximations in some cases. For 
example, where a number was reported as "900+" or "3900+," we dropped the"+" in calculating 
the means. Also, we used 250 in one merger where the change in the HHI was reported as lying 
between 200 to 300. 
The lowest change in HHI among mergers the Commission evaluated (zero) resulted from a 
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TABLE 1 
CONCENTRATION LEVELS AND CHANGES 
[Vol. 77:777 
FOR MERGERS WITH SERIOUS EFFICIENCY CLAIMSt 
Bureau of Competition Staff Bureau of Economics Staff 
Postmerger Change in Postmerger Change in 
HHI the HHI HHI the HHI 
Group It (June 1982-March 1985) 
Low 1508 212 1005 109 
High 2574 479 2290 339 
Mean 1989 291 1755 238 
Median 1929 262 1921 236 
Group 2t (April1985-December 1986) 
Low 1223 154 1223 150 
High 5041 2100 5041 2121 
Mean 2942 656 2894 606 
Median 2662 597 2662 538 
Total Sample 
Low 1223 154 1005 109 
High 5041 2100 5041 2121 
Mean 2541 502 2414 451 
Median 2172 308 2177 304 
Source: Confidential memoranda to the Federal Trade Commission during June 1982-
December 1986; see the description in the text accompanying notes 79 and 80. We thank 
Malcolm Coate for sharing this data set, which he compiled for the Commission. 
Table 1 and the accompanying analysis rely on non public information from Federal Trade 
Commission internal files. Mr. Fisher obtained access to the underlying data as a Commissiqn 
employee. The Commission's General Counsel authorized publication of these summary 
statistics under § 5.12(c) of the Federal Trade Commission Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. 
§ 5.12(c). 
Notes: 
t The data are from 19 of the 70 horizontal mergers with predicted postmerger HHI levels in 
excess of 1000 for which the Commission requested additional information during this period 
under Hart-Scott-Rodino provisions, supra note 1. Among those 70 mergers, the data set 
includes all proposed acquisitions in which the Bureau of Competition or Bureau of 
Economics staff judged that significant merger-specific efficiency gains were a reasonably likely 
result. There is no way to verify when, if at all, the Commission shared this judgment. 
Merger decisions include factors other than concentration and anticipated efficiency 
gains; entry conditions and factors that influence the ability to collude are two of the most 
important. To help preserve the Commission's confidentiality, we have not reported any 
information on these factors, and we have not reported the Commission's resolution. The 
Commission challenged a large proportion of the 19 mergers in this sample. 
t Group 1 includes mergers for which the Commission issued a request for additional 
information from June 1982 to March 1985. Group 2 includes mergers for which the 
Commission issued a request for additional information from April 1985 to December 1986. 
Since a request for additional information comes 15 to 30 days after firms file Hart-Scott-
Rodino documents, these data indicate that firms proposed more mergers with noticeably 
higher market shares beginning approximately in March 1985. 
There were 8 mergers in Group 1 and 11 in Group 2. For Group I, the median is the 
average of the fourth and fifth highest values. 
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simulated the market power/efficiency tradeoff for HHI changes of 100, 
200, 500, and 1000. 
3. Elasticity of Demand 
The Merger Guidelines' market definition methodology determines 
the plausible range for elasticity of demand for relevant products. 81 The 
Merger Guidelines define a relevant antitrust market as "a product or 
group of products and a geographic area in which it is sold such that a 
hypothetical profit maximizing" cartel would raise price by a designated 
percentage. 82 The Department initially defined relevant markets as those 
in which a cartel could impose a five percent price rise; in the 1984 revi-
sion, the Department replaced five percent with an unspecified "small 
but significant and nontransitory increase in price."83 Outside observers 
report that the Department has recently adopted a 10% test, reportedly 
the level that the Department's economists had initially proposed. 84 
Selection of a permissible price increase determines the relevant 
range for elasticity of demand. 85 For an initially competitive market, the 
relevant range for l'l'J I would be 5 to II for a 10% test and 10 to 21 for a 
5% test. 86 If l'l'J I were less than these levels, the hypothetical cartel could 
increase price by more than the designated 10 or 5%. In terms of the 
Merger Guidelines, the proposed market would be too broad and should 
be redefined to include fewer products. 87 If l'l'J I exceeded these levels, the 
hypothetical cartel could not increase price by the designated percentage. 
potential competition complaint (B.A.T Industries) issued May 13, 1980 and dismissed Dec. 17, 
1984. See In re B.A.T Industries, 104 F.T.C. 852 (1984). The next smallest change in the HHI was 
125 for one of six markets challenged in L'Air Liquide. 
81. The elasticity of demand for a product defines the percentage by which a hypothetical 
cartel could increase price for a given effect on sales. It is the percentage change in the quantity 
demanded that would result from a given percentage change in price (%£Q/%£P). The universal 
abbreviation for elasticity of demand is the Greek letter eta (11)· Since price and amount demanded 
change in opposite directions along a demand curve, 11 < 0. Many economists, however, drop the 
negative sign. For clarity, we specify 1111· 
82. I 984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 23, at § 2.0. Compare 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra 
note 21, at § II.A., with 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 23, at § 2.0. 
83. 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 21, at§ II.A; 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 23, 
at§ 2.0. 
84. "The economists at the Department of Justice had favored a 10 percent, two-year test 
(which would still be my preference) .... " White, Antitrust and Merger Policy: A Review and 
Critique, 1 J. EcoN. PERSP. Fall 1987, 13, 15; supra note 48. 
85. For a thorough treatment, see Johnson, Market Definition Under the Merger Guidelines: 
Critical Demand Elasticities, forthcoming in 12 RESEARCH lN LAW AND EcONOMICS (1989). 
86. For an initially competitive market with constant costs and a linear demand, a cartel could 
increase price by 10% if 1111 equalled 5 and by 5% if111l equalled 10. For constant elasticity of 
demand and constant costs, a cartel could increase price by 10% if111l equalled 11 and by 5% ifl11l 
equalled 21. Id. 
87. See 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 23, at§ 2.11. 
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In terms of the Merger Guidelines, the proposed market would be too 
narrow and should be redefined to include more close substitutes. 88 
For above-Guideline mergers, where oligopoly is the relevant oper-
ating assumption, the critical elasticities of demand are lower. For exam-
ple, for constant elasticity of demand, the critical elasticity of demand is 
about 20% lower for a Cournot equilibrium with a premerger HHI of 
2500 than for a premerger competitive market-8.5 for a 10% test and 
16 for a 5% standard.89 Taking into account increasing costs as wel1,90 a 
more realistic range for 1111 is 2 to 5 for a 10% rule and 5 to 10 for a 5% 
rule. We therefore evaluated the effects of mergers in our oligopoly mod-
els for 1111 of 2, 5, and 10. 
Given the relevant values for the change in the HHI and elasticity of 
demand and our four models of the effects of merger on firms' conjec-
tures, we were able to simulate the merger-specific efficiency gains (per-
centage decrease in marginal costs) necessary to keep price from 
increasing. We simulated the necessary efficiency gains over a range of 
-1 (competitive) to 0 (Cournot) for conjectural variations, k.91 The pre-
dictions of the four models were similar. 92 
88. Id. 
89. If we assume that a merger transforms an industry with constant marginal costs from 
Coumot to monopolistic pricing, the critical elasticities depend on the premerger HHI. Appendix B, 
section E shows how the critical demand elasticity varies with the premerger HHI, assuming 
constant elasticity of demand. Compare these results with those supra at note 86. We provide our 
example here and in Appendix B for Coumot and constant elasticity of demand, the least complex to 
analyze formally. The result that oligopoly lowers the critical demand elasticity holds for all 
demand specifications, although the magnitudes vary. Because of this variation, we keep a wide 
range of demand elasticities for our simulations. 
90. Increasing (upward-sloping) marginal costs also reduce the critical elasticity of demand. 
Depending on the elasticity of supply, increasing marginal costs can reduce the critical elasticity of 
demand by approximately 50%. Johnson, supra note 85. Although we have not attempted the 
formidable task of simulating the joint effect of increasing marginal costs and initial market power, 
the combined effect would ·presumably be to reduce the critical levels by more than 50% in 
comparison to an initially competitive industry with constant marginal costs. 
91. For an intuitive interpretation of these values of k, see supra note 74. We iterated the 
computations at intervals of 0.05 over this range. When possible, we assumed that both merging 
firms had the same values of k. However, this assumption would be inconsistent with Models B and 
e, which assume that both firms have the same value of k' after they merge. In our simulations of 
Models B and e, we therefore selected initial values of k 1 for the larger of the merging firms and then 
selected a consistent value of k 2 for the other firm. In Model D, where k depends on n, the number 
of firms before the merger, we simulated over a range of n = 3 to 9. 
The relationship between percentage change in marginal cost (%"MC) and k was very close to 
linear. A linear interpolation between the minimum and maximum values of %"Me would 
therefore enable the reader to approximate %"Me for any desired value of k over the interval 
[ -1,0]. 
92. In all cases, the relationship between the percentage decrease in marginal costs and k was 
monotonic, and in all but a few extreme instances in Model D it was largest at k=O (eoumot 
assumptions). In some instances, the minima in Model D were the eoumot solutions. However, 
these situations only occurred when the underlying model was unrealistic. The reversals occurred 
when there were few firms (a small n) and one of the merging firms was very small. For example, 
there was a Coumot minimum when there were 3 firms and the merging firms' shares were 50% and 
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Figure 3 shows our estimates of how great the merger-specific effi-
ciency gains must be to keep price from rising. 93 The diagram shows a 
series of horizontal lines, each depicting a range of the percentage 
decrease in marginal costs necessary to prevent a price increase as k 
increases from -1 to 0.94 This range encompasses all the predictions 
2%. It would be unrealistic to expect both firms to have the same conjectural variations in this case, 
as the model implies. Model D therefore makes sense only when the merging firms have similar 
market shares. All four models gave the same percentage decrease in marginal costs under Cournot 
assumptions, because Cournot sets k=O and thus k'=k for all models. Under Model A, the 
smallest percentage decrease in marginal costs was zero; for the other models, the smallest 
percentage decrease in marginal costs was positive but generally small compared to the largest value. 
93. In most cases, the merging firms would face differently shaped MC curves and would 
therefore have to realize disproportionate reductions in MC for each to continue to produce at its 
premerger level. The figures for % .. MC reported in Figure 3 are the averages for both firms, with 
each firm's requisite cost savings weighted by its premerger output. This single figure is more 
meaningful than the two separate figures, because our primary concern is with the net output of the 
merged firm, not the individual outputs of the constituent plants. 
MR and MC must be positive for the resulting equilibrium to be reasonable. From Equation (2) 
of Appendix A, one can easily demonstrate that this requirement is equivalent to requiring that (s 1 
+ s1) (I + k') < 1111· By definition, 0 < s1 + s1.:S. I. Also, since -I ..:5. k .::;_ 0, 0 .::;_(I + k') .::;_ I. 
Their product is therefore also between 0 and 1. Since the reasonable range for 1111 is between 2 and 
10, we can be certain that MR and MC are positive. 
94. Denote the premerger percentage market shares of the merging firms as [share I, share 2]. 
For .. HHI= 100, we selected mergers from [7.07, 7.07] to [10, 5]; for .. HHI=200, mergers from [IO, 
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from the four models. All models predict the same maximum value for 
the percentage decrease in marginal costs to keep price from rising 
(reached under Cournot assumptions); differences arise only in the pre-
dicted necessary minimum values. 
For a 10% rule and a change in the HHI of 500---approximately the 
mean for recent above-Guideline mergers in which there have been seri-
ous efficiency claims-the antitrust agencies and courts should be look-
ing for decreases in marginal costs for the merging firms of 0 to 9% to 
ensure that price not increase as a result of the merger. However, differ-
ent assumptions can change the results. 
D. Varying the Assumptions: Collusion and Other Variants 
In our analysis of oligopoly so far, we have assumed that all 
nonmerging firms maintain the same conjectural variations (views of how 
they, the merging firms, and their other rivals would react to changes in 
output).95 The analysis becomes more complicated if we relax this 
assumption. If the nonmerging firms viewed the merged firm as less 
rivalrous than its predecessors, the nonmerging firms might reduce their 
rates of production. The merged firm would then need greater cost sav-
ings than those predicted in Figure 3 to induce it to expand output to 
compensate for its rivals' reductions. Alternatively, the nonmerging 
firms might view the merged firm as a more vigorous competitor and 
therefore react by expanding output and reducing prices. If so, the 
merged firm would need smaller cost savings than those predicted in Fig-
ure 3 to ensure that industry output and price remain constant. Indeed, 
a merger that increased rivalry could result in price remaining constant 
or even falling. 96 
10] to [20, 5]; for AHHI=500, mergers from [15.81, 15.81] to [25, 10]; for AHHI= 1000, mergers 
from [22.36, 22.36] to [50, 10]. In some cases, more disparate market shares would have widened the 
range of requisite cost savings. However, including mergers involving acquired firms with market 
shares below 5% stretches the credibility of the underlying assumption that the merging firms both 
affect price. To calculate the effects of a merger involving firms with smaller market shares, one 
should probably use a different model, such as the dominant firm model. For a discussion of some 
properties of such a model, see Mallela & Nahata, Effects of Horizolltal Merger on Price, Profits, and 
Market Power in a Dominant-Firm Oligopoly, 3 INT'L EcoN. J. 55 (1989). Model D generated 
higher maxima than the other models under some unrealistic assumptions involving mergers of firms 
with more disparate market shares. We did not include these outliers in Figure 3. 
95. This assumption seems reasonable and internally consistent; it means that a firm has no 
incentive to change its behavior if its demand and cost conditions and the prices it faces all remain 
unchanged. This assumption, called a "Nash equilibrium," is common in oligopoly model building. 
See, e.g., J. CASE, supra note 76, at 30. 
96. Even if the nonmerging firms did not change their conjectures after a merger, the merging 
firms might change theirs and become more rivalrous. Ordover, Sykes, and Willig investigated this 
possibility in a paper examining the sensitivity of market power to changes ink. See Ordover, Sykes 
& Willig, Herjindahl Concentration, Rivalry, and Mergers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1857 (1982). 
Analytically, they modeled an increase in rivalry as a decrease ink. For example, under their model, 
if k fell from k=O to k= -0.5 and firms' costs remained unchanged, price would remain constant if 
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This analysis demonstrates the difficulty of assessing the impact of a 
merger on market power. Without excellent information about all 
aspects of the relevant market model, including the psychological effects 
of a merger on other firms in the industry, we can say very little about 
the cost savings needed to offset market power effects. Even among the 
models that we discuss, the range of possible tradeoff values is very 
broad. In general, the less elastic the market demand in the relevant 
range, or the larger the market shares involved, the greater the cost sav-
ings must be to keep price from increasing and output from falling. 
Nonetheless, our model building establishes a range of necessary 
efficiency gains sufficient to offset an increase in market power. Our sim-
ulations show that an above-Guideline merger in a noncollusive oligop-
oly, with a change in the HHI of up to 1,000, would require decreases in 
marginal costs of 0 to 12.6% to keep price from increasing. The precise 
amount depends on the change in the HHI, the elasticity of demand, and 
the value of conjectural variations. If the merger changed the conjec-
tures of nonmerging firms, the range would expand to include both nega-
tive and larger positive percentages. 
These figures, however, do not represent "average" efficiency gains 
that merging firms would have to realize to keep price from rising. 
Rather, they cover a range of efficiency gains that might be necessary 
depending on how the merging firms viewed competition. While some 
mergers at the Guideline thresholds might not require any cost savings to 
prevent price rises, mergers significantly above the Guidelines might 
require substantial efficiency gains. Values at either the lower or upper 
end of the range are plausible if the underlying models are valid. Other 
models of conjectural variations could extend the range of possible requi-
site cost savings. Unfortunately, we have little theoretical or empirical 
basis to determine either the HHI levels or the non-structural conditions 
for which any given industry is likely to experience Coumot, collusive, or 
some other specific form of oligopolistic pricing behavior. 97 
Table 2 provides some perspective for the simulation results and 
helps demonstrate the relative importance of independent firm oligopoly 
two equal-sized firms merged and would actually fall if firms of unequal size merged. Our models A-
D imply that k either remains constant or increases (firms become more rivalrous) as a result of a 
merger. 
Another approach would be to start with a dominant firm model. Mallela and Nahata, supra 
note 94, demonstrated that if a dominant firm acquired a fringe firm and transferred its lower costs 
to its acquired assets, price could increase, decrease, or remain constant. They showed that the 
greater the number of fringe firms, the greater the possibility that such an acquisition would lead to a 
decrease in price. 
97. See, e.g., supra note 66; Pautler, supra note 60. A merger changes the underlying 
concentration (HHI). With the change in underlying structure, that is, increased concentration not 
exactly offset by efficiency gain, the firms are more able to collude. The incentive is unchanged; with 
additional concentration not offset by efficiency gains, the change is the increased ability to collude. 
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TABLE 2 
EFFICIENCY GAINS NECESSARY TO PREVENT PRICE INCREASES* 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Competition Coumot Coumot 
to Coumot to Coumot to Monopoly Competition 
HHI=2500t .. HHI=500 HHI=2500t to MonoEolyf,± 
lril = 2 12.5% 8.6% 42.9% 50.0% 
lril = 5 5.0 3.3 15.8 20.0 
lril =10 2.5 1.6 7.7 10.0 
Notes: 
* For the formulas used to derive these figures, see Appendix A for column (2) and 
Appendix B for columns (1), (3), and (4). 
For column (1), the postmerger HHI is 2500; for column (3), the premerger HHI is 
2500. Since competitive, Coumot, and monopolistic pricing may occur over wide ranges 
of HHis, one need not specify a change in the HHI for columns (1), (3), or (4). Also, 
column (2) applies for all HHI levels for which Coumot behavior applies. 
The models in columns (1), (3), and (4) hypothesize extensive changes in market 
behavior from a single merger. See supra note 76, and infra notes 98 and 100. The model 
building in Appendix A, which underlies Figure 3, describes actual market behavior far 
more realistically. 
For interpretation, see notes 95-105 and accompanying text. 
t For columns (1), (3), and (4), the ealculations assume that all firms in the 
market-those merging and those not merging-achieve the same percentage reductions 
in marginal costs. One would normally expect only the merging firms to achieve the 
efficiency gains, as we assume in column (2). One might try to estimate the required cost 
savings in this case by dividing the cost savings in the table by the combined market share 
of the merging firms. For example, for competition to Coumot, l'l'J I = 5, and a combined 
market share of 40%, one might expect the merging firms to need 12.5%, not 5.0%, cost 
savings to keep price from rising. However, with cost differences of 12.5% between the 
merging and other firms, there would not be a stable equilibrium. The merged firm 
would drive its competitors out of business unless they obtained comparable efficiency 
gains. Without more information, we could not predict the new equilibrium. However, 
we can say that the figures in columns (1), (3), and (4) understate the efficiency gains that 
would be necessary to keep price from increasing when only the merging firms obtain the 
cost savings. 
t Column (4) should equal column (1) plus column (3). Properly summed, it does. 
Take, for example, the second line. For competition to monopoly and l'l'J I = 5, marginal 
costs must fall by 20% to keep price from rising. In column (1), marginal costs fall by 
.05, from 1 to .95. Column (3) indicates that marginal costs must fall by a further .158. 
A decrease of .158 means that marginal costs will be 1 minus .158, or .842 of the Coumot 
level (which we found to be .95 from column (1)). From competition to monopoly, then, 
marginal costs will end up at (.842) (.95), or 80% of the competitive level-thus 
indicating a drop of 20%. One can verify the other entries by following the same 
methodology. 
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and collusion for the market power/efficiency tradeoff.98 The "theoreti-
cal maximum" decrease in marginal costs necessary to offset the 
increased market power and keep price constant would arise if a merger 
led an industry from competitive to monopolistic (perfectly collusive) 
pricing. The necessary reduction in marginal costs is equal to l/]11!,99 
where !11 I is the elasticity of demand evaluated at the competitive price. 
Thus, under simplistic assumptions, the "maximum necessary'' efficiency 
gains would be 10% for 1111=10, 20% for 1111=5~ and 50% for 1111=2.100 
For a Coumot oligopoly and an HHI change of 500, the merging firms 
would need decreases in marginal costs of 1.6%, 3.3%, or 8.6%, depend-
ing on the elasticity of demand. These efficiency gains are 16% to 17% 
of those necessary to offset the "theoretical maximum" increase in mar-
ket power. 101 With less anticompetitive conjectural variations (values of 
k closer to -1), the necessary decreases in marginal costs would be less 
than the amounts under Coumot assumptions. 
Alternatively, one might postulate that a merger would transform 
an industry from competitive to Coumot pricing. Under this assump-
tion, the decrease in marginal costs necessary to keep price from rising 
would range from 2.5% to 12.5% for a postmerger HHI of 2500 and 
98. We undertake the comparisons in these two paragraphs and Table 2 with some reluc1ance, 
because it is generally unrealistic to assume that a single merger will transform any market from 
competitive to Coumot, from Coumot to monopolistic, or from competitive to monopolistic pricing. 
See supra note 66 and infra note 100. Indeed, predictions of market transformations, all of which are 
probabilistic, are probably even more speculative than predictions of general market power and 
efficiency effects. The comparison, however, enables us to evaluate the relative importance of 
concentration (with independent pricing) and collusion. 
99. For a graphicaValgebraic proof in the special case of linear demand and cons1ant marginal 
cost, see Fisher, Lande & Vandaele, supra note 17. For a more general proof, see Appendix B, 
section C. 
100. If one interpreted the 1984 Merger Guidelines as defining a de minimis exception for price 
increases of up to 10%, see supra note 48, the cost savings necessary to offset a change from 
competitive to monopolistic pricing would be less. For example, the estimates of requisite cost 
savings reported in Fisher, Lande & Vandaele, supra note 17, at 1704, would fall by.20 percentage 
points at each elasticity of demand, for a permitted price increase of 10%. 
These figures assume that the cost and price changes occur for the entire industry. If a merger 
created efficiency gains for only the merging firms, the required cost savings would be greater. 
However, one cannot generally say how much greater. If merger-specific efficiency gains brought a 
firm's marginal costs subs1antially below those of its competitors, the firms could be unable to agree 
on a common pricing scheme-collusion would be less likely, and one could not reliably predict 
price effects. With dramatic efficiency gains from a merger, one might expect dominant-firm pricing 
and a strong push among the remaining firms to duplicate the efficiency gains. The immediate post-
merger results would thus not represent an equilibrium. 
Another caution in interpreting tltese figures arises from the Department's metltodology of 
defining a relevant product market for antitrust purposes. If firms could raise prices by more than 
10% in response to a merger, the Department should logically argue tltat the proposed market was 
too broad. For an explanation, see supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text. 
101. For a Coumot oligopoly and an HHI change of 1000, the necessary efficiency gains would 
be 2.3%, 4.7%, and 12.6%, 'depending on the elasticity of demand-roughly 23% to 25% of the 
"theoretical maximum." 
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from 3% to 15% for a postmerger HHI of 3000, for I'll I of 10 to 2. 102 
These figures for the necessary efficiency gains are 25% of the "theoreti-
cal maximum" for a postmerger HHI of 2500 and 30% for a postmerger 
HHI of3000. 
Although the rigid models summarized in Table 2 are less realistic 
and reliable than the results in Figure 3, they validate the focus in the 
Merger Guidelines on collusion as the major anticompetitive threat of 
merger. As Table 2 indicates, the most dramatic anticompetitive effects 
result only when a merger enables an industry to engage in collusive con-
duct. A merger producing a change in the HHI of 500 (column (2)) 
requires at most only 16% to 17% of the "theoretical maximum" effi-
cienay gains necessary to offset a change from competitive to monopolis-
tic (perfectly collusive) pricing. 
Figure 3 summarizes the large range of results possible under our 
"theoretically neutral" model. Not all these values, however, are equally 
probable, especially for HHI levels and changes near or below the Guide-
lines. Most mergers are unlikely to raise price or restrict output. 103 The 
assumptions underlying our models further reduce the likelihood of 
mergers requiring cost savings near the upper limits of the tradeoff val-
ues. Our models explicitly assume no possibility of entry; and for values 
of k approaching zero (where the requisite efficiency gains reach their 
maximums), they implicitly assume that fringe firms have little ability to 
expand. 104 Moreover, entry barriers tend to be highest in narrowly 
defined markets, where firms inhabit narrow niches and compete some-
what indirectly with similar products. The availability of similar prod-
ucts, however, usually corresponds to relatively elastic demand, which 
limits the merged firm's ability to raise price. This analysis implies that 
for narrowly defined markets with numerous (though imperfect) substi-
tutes and high entry barriers (a k value near zero), cost savings signifi-
cantly less than the theoretical maximum would prevent price from 
rising. Thus for mergers near or below the Guidelines, the requisite effi-
ciency gains would typically be near the bottom of the estimated ranges. 
The Williamsonian tradeoff of decreased costs and increased allocative 
inefficiency105 has only become relevant in the last half dozen years as the 
102. For the formula, see Appendix B, section A. Again, if we assume that only the merging 
firms achieve the efficiency gains, the required cost reductions would be greater but not generally 
predictable. See supra Table 2 n. t. 
103. For the experience under Hart-Scott-Rodino filings, supra note I, see supra text 
accompanying notes 61-62. Even under an economic efficiency standard, the first step would be to 
assess the probability of an increase in market power leading to an increase in price. The record on 
second requests under Hart-Scott-Rodino indicates that the enforcers have judged this probability to 
be minimal in more than 90% of reported mergers in recent years. 
104. Dropping the assumption of no entry is equivalent to assuming k= -I (that is, entry would 
frustrate any attempts of the merged firm to restrict output and raise prices). 
105. See Williamson, supra note 5, at 22-23, 34. 
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agencies and courts have started evaluating above-Guideline mergers 
with the potential to create or enhance market power. 
v 
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: WORKABILITY AND IMPLEMENTATION 
The modeling and simulations in Part IV demonstrate that oligop-
oly complicates the tradeoff between efficiency and market power. The 
discussion raises two obvious questions: is a price standard as workable 
as an efficiency criterion; and under either a price or an economic effi-
ciency approach, how can antitrust enforcers and the courts best incor-
porate efficiency considerations? 
A. Workability Considerations 
1. Price Versus Economic Efficiency 
Price is more workable than economic efficiency as a merger stan-
dard because its modeling is more straightforward. Under the price stan-
dard, one needs to describe the industry and identify the values of a few 
underlying parameters to determine how large cost savings would have 
to be to prevent price from rising or output from falling. This task alone, 
however, probably exceeds the abilities of the litigation system. 106 
A model that incorporated an economic efficiency standard would 
be even more complex and require much more information to solve. 
Unlike our treatment, an efficiency-based model would require that one 
evaluate the potential efficiency gains from a merger even after determin-
ing that the merger would probably lead to an increase in price and a fall 
in output. This tradeoff analysis would require that one know the finn's 
marginal cost and marginal revenue schedules over the relevant output 
ranges107 in addition to all the information needed to analyze a merger 
under the price standard. 108 Economic efficiency advocates generally 
recognize the administrative complexity of their standard and therefore 
propose a simplified operational approximation-an output rule that is 
106. The requirement that one distinguish between the effects of claimed efficiency gains on 
fixed and variable costs complicates use of a price standard. The price standard requires a focus on 
efficiency gains most likely to reduce price-variable (marginal) cost savings. Experience in 
predatory pricing litigation has shown that it is often difficult in practice to distinguish between fixed 
and variable costs. See, e.g., Hurwitz & Kovacic, Judicial Analysis of Predation: The Emerging 
Trends, 35 VAND. L. REv. 63, 77-83 (1982). Indeed, a focus on variable cost savings might even 
induce a firm inefficiently to switch some of its costs from fixed to variable to help meet an efficiency 
test. 
107. See supra note 73. 
108. The price standard also has an empirical advantage. It is sometimes possible to observe 
after the fact whether price rose and output fell. By Contrast, the tradeoff under the economic 
efficiency test-whether marginal costs fell sufficiently to offset the adverse effects of reduced 
output-eludes hindsight as well as foresight. 
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virtually identical to the price standard. 109 Indeed, when the Reagan 
administration proposed legislative reform of the Clayton Act in 1986, it 
recommended using an explicit price standard to evaluate mergers. 110 
2. Case-by-Case Versus Rule-Based Approaches 
Whether one tests mergers by a price or an economic efficiency stan-
dard, the enforcement options range along a spectrum from case-by-case 
evaluation under a rule of reason standard to a rigid adherence to formal 
rules. 111 Virtually every approach starts with merger guidelines based on 
market structure. From this common start, a formal, rule-based 
approach incorporates efficiency gains by raising the permissible concen-
tration levels and changes to account for average gains in efficiency. 112 
The case-by-case approach at the other end of the spectrum assumes that 
enforcement agencies and courts can "properly" evaluate the tradeoff 
between market power increases and efficiency gains in most cases, with-
out unduly increasing administrative and uncertainty costs. In theory, 
society could capture enormous gains by selectively permitting socially 
desirable above-guideline mergers and attacking undesirable acquisitions 
that would pass guidelines that had been raised to accommodate average 
efficiency gains. 
109. See, e.g., Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1, 31-33 (1984) (proposing 
a series of filters in an attempt to ensure that only practices likely to result in reduced output or 
increased prices would be subject to the Rule of Reason); Posner, ThJ Next Step in the Antitrust 
Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 6, 21 (1981) (proposing to 
make a restriction's effect on output a central feature of an assessment of whether it increases 
competition) [hereinafter Posner, The Next Step]; Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic 
Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. I, 16-17 (1977) (proposing to 
determine the permissibility of restrictions on distribution by measuring their effects on output) 
[hereinafter Posner, Reflections]; see also supra note 11 (describing why the output and price 
standards are virtually identical). 
110. The Merger Modernization Act of 1986 proposed changing section 7 of the Oayton Act 
from a ban on mergers "substantially [likely] to lessen competition, or to tend to create a 
monopoly," 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982), to a ban on mergers likely to "increase the ability to exercise 
market power," S. 2160, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a) (1986). The proposed bill defined the ability to 
exercise market power as "the ability of one or more firms profitably to maintain prices above 
competitive levels for a significant period of time." /d. at § 2(d). The 1986 proposal was the most 
serious of the administration's several attempts to amend the Clayton Act to institutionalize an 
efficiency defense. See supra note 25; see also Judge Ginsburg's discussion of the 1986 proposal, 
supra note 24. 
111. Intermediate policies try to limit the area of subjective evaluation. However, although one 
can frequently carve out useful exceptions to rules or presumptions, unstructured or unclear 
approaches frequently degenerate into full-blown investigations (rule of reason at its worst). See 
generally, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 109; Posner, The Next Step, supra note 109, and Posner, 
Reflections, supra note 109. 
112. By "average gains in efficiency" we mean the average decrease in marginal costs that 
mergers of a certain HHI level and change would generate. Of course, the best one could do would 
be to make a rough estimate of what this figure might be. In practice, one would raise the HHI 
thresholds somewhat to account for this presumed effect. The Merger Guidelines apparently 
adopted this approach. See supra note 23. 
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A case-by-case approach, however, would probably prove unwork-
ably complex under either a price or efficiency standard. If done cor-
rectly, case-by-case implementation under either standard would require 
economic analysis far beyond the abilities of the merging parties, the 
enforcers, or the courts. Decision makers would need to determine 
which model and what parameter values correctly described the affected 
market113 before they could calculate the decrease in marginal costs nec-
essary to justify the merger. 114 They would also need to assess the likeli-
hood that the requisite cost savings would actually arise. 115 
Allowing for product heterogeneity (quality and variety changes) 
complicates the analysis even more. The question then becomes: "How 
much of a decrease in costs would compensate for a given increase in 
market power and ensure that price (for a given level of quality and vari-
ety) not increase, if we also expected quality or variety to increase by x 
percent (or decrease by y percent)?"116 If quality or variety and either 
price or cost were to change in the same direction, one would need to 
ensure that the change in quality or variety sufficiently compensated for 
the change in price or cost. 117 
113. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of some of the difficulties 
inherent in constructing accurate models of oligopolistic markets. 
114. Indeed, in practice, it would ofteu be difficult to distinguish the precise difference in the 
requisite cost savings under one standard from that under the other. There is one safe 
generalization: for an economic efficiency standard, cost saviugs would only need to be sufficieut to 
offset the deadweight loss of allocative inefficiency. A price standard, however, would require 
efficiency gains large enough to prevent price increases. The efficiency gains required by a merger 
would therefore be smaller under the economic efficieucy than under the price standard. 
115. Experts have tended to make grossly inaccurate predictions of both efficiency gains and 
inefficiency losses from mergers. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 5, at 1619-24, and infra note 132. 
116. The same unanswerable question could equally well arise under an economic efficiency 
standard. For example, in Figure 1 we might require that rectangle C equal triangle D rather than 
requiring that price n'ot increase. If one simplified the analysis by combining quality and variety as 
one complex additive factor, one could use a three-dimensional diagram to visualize this tradeoff. If 
one considered quality and variety as separate factors, one could . work with a series of three-
dimensional diagrams, each holding constant one of the parameters at a pre-selected value. In 
practice, this task would be even more difficult than it sounds. 
117. This statement applies equally for an economic efficiency or a price standard. Suppose one 
expected both price and quality to decrease. To justify a merger, one would need to demonstrate 
that margiual costs would be likely to decrease sufficiently to offset the decline in quality. Otherwise, 
higher costs (diseconomies) might result from the merger with a reduced price masking the 
deterioration in quality. In theory, careful hedonic testing (testing that measures changes in quality) 
could determine whether prices fell sufficiently to offset any quality deterioratiou. However, even if 
the quality changes had already occurred, parties in litigation would rarely agree on hedonic 
estimatiug methodology. Similar factual questions arise when both price and quality increase. 
Predicted (and therefore unknown) changes in product quality or variety are even harder to 
evaluate. One would need to anticipate in advance whether a proposed merger's expected efficiency 
gaius and lower price would be sufficient to compensate for anticipated reductions in product quality 
or variety. This task is inherently less reliable than observing actual changes that have occurred. 
The task might be impossible and would certainly be impossible to resolve through litigation. 
Whoever had the burden of proof would almost certainly lose. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 5, at 
1634-35. 
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The testing necessary to measure changes in quality and variety is 
enormously difficult in theory; in litigation, it would probably be impossi-
ble. 118 Yet under either a price or an efficiency standard, a court evaluat-
ing mergers case by case would have to measure quality and variety 
changes to determine whether to permit a contested merger.U9 This 
approach would force the court to balance a confusing and complex com-
bination of dissimilar factors. The Commission had a hint of this confu-
sion and complexity the first time after the 1982 revision of merger policy 
that it considered efficiency gains explicitly in a merger opinion. 120 
The complications extend beyond product heterogeneity. Even 
when a merger increases efficiency, the adjustment can be stormy, and 
the merged company's marginal costs may decline only after a lengthy 
period. 121 Moreover, at least one of the firms might have achieved com-
parable efficiency gains through less anticompetitive means, such as a 
licensing arrangement, joint venture, or less anticompetitive merger. 122 
Alternatively, a merger between multiproduct firms with only partial 
horizontal overlaps could create management or other synergies or pro-
duce benefits for other products. Distinguishing between the effects of 
ll8. See supra note ll7. 
ll9. One court included the prediction of higher quality as an additional reason to allow a 
merger of two hospitals. This court, however, believed that merger would have no anticompetitive 
effect: it felt that the acquisition would lower, not raise, prices. United States v. Carilion Health 
System, 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 68,451 (D. W. Va. 1989). 
120. See In re American Medical International, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1, 220 (1984). In that case, the 
respondents argued: 
In addition to saving costs, consolidation is expected to improve the quality of medical 
services by aggregating at a single facility patient volume that is now divided between the 
two hospitals. Higher volumes enhance quality by making it economically feasible for a 
hospital to upgrade its equipment and to reeruit and train expert support personnel. 
Moreover, increased volume provides greater opportunities for physicians and staff to 
sharpen their skills. Mr. Derzon, who has been involved in the hospital field for twenty-
five years, testified that the quality enhancements flowing from consolidation are of even 
greater significance than the cost savings. 
Brief in Support of Respondents' Proposed Findings of Faet and Conclusions of Law at 74, In re 
American Medical International, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1 (1984) (Doc. 9158) (citations omitted) (on file 
with the authors). Neither the Administrative Law Judge nor the Commission found the arguments 
convincing. See 104 F.T.C. at 148-55, 219-20. 
121. See, e.g., Rose, Occidental's Purchase of Cities Service Does Little to Increase U.S. Oil 
Reserves, Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 1984, at 24, col. 1; Wells & Hymowitz, Takeover Trauma: Gulf's 
Managers Find Merger Into Chevron Forces Many Changes, Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 1984, at I, col. 6; 
Magnet, Acquiring Without Smothering. FoRTUNE, Nov. 12, 1984, at 22. In some cases, a merger 
may appear in retrospect to have been a great success for a while but then ultimately to have been a 
mistake---iJr vice-versa. For an example, see infra note 132. 
122. For some discussion of how members of the Commission's staff have been evaluating these 
and other issues in practice, see R. Stoner, Merger Enforcement at the FTC Under the New Merger 
Guidelines (July 2, 1985) (unpublished manuscript) (presented at the Western Economic Association 
Meetings, Anaheim, Cal., July 2, 1985) (on file with the authors); C. Pidano & L. Silvia, Analysis of 
Efficiencies in Horizontal Mergers and Joint Ventures at the FTC's Bureau of Economics (Nov. 
1984) (unpublished manuscript) (presented at the Southern Economic Association Convention, 
Atlanta, Ga., Nov. 1984) (on file with the authors). 
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claimed efficiency gains on fixed and variable costs complicates the analy-
sis even more. 123 These and other considerations124 clearly imply that 
the tradeoff calculations would typically be horribly complex in practice, 
especially given the creativity of antitrust attorneys and economists. 
During litigation, each side would have experts with very different 
opinions of the appropriate model and values of the parameters. Each 
side would try to convince or confuse a judge whose training and experi-
ence would typically be neither in economics nor in business. 125 The 
legal system is far better suited to resolving "either-or" disputes than to 
balancing factors in a multivariable analysis, especially under the time 
constraints of a preliminary injunction setting. 126 
B. Enforcement Options 
Perhaps because they recognize the difficulties of a case-by-case 
approach, neither the courts nor the enforcement agencies. seem to 
attempt this complex tradeoff very often. Based on the authors' collec-
tive experience in the area, the typical merger analysis assumes away the 
problem: it finds either anticompetitive effects probable and efficiency 
gains implausible, or anticompetitive effects unlikely and merger-specific 
efficiency gains convincing. Many decisionmakers may avoid recogniz-
ing the tradeoff because there has not yet been a satisfactory way to 
assess how extensively efficiency must increase to offset market power 
effects in oligopolistic markets where the tradeoff is most likely to be 
relevant. 127 Moreover, a decisionmaker might mistrust her ability to cal-
culate these gains and costs even if she knew the target values. Suppose a 
specific merger would need to generate 3.3% marginal cost savings to 
offset probable market power effects. Who would wish to predict that a 
given merger would be likely to generate only 3.1% marginal cost sav-
ings rather than the required 3.3%?128 
123. The price standard requires a focus on efficiency gains most likely to reduce price-
variable (marginal) cost savings. It is often difficult in practice to distinguish fixed from variable 
costs. See supra note 106. 
124. For an extensive discussion of these complicating considerations, see Fisher & Lande, 
supra note 5, at 1624-50. 
125. For a thorough exposition, see id. at 1651-77. 
126. See Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of 
Adjudication, 73 CoLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1534-42 (1973) (discussi!lg the notion of "polycentric" 
decisionmaking in the design defect context). Professor Henderson drew this concept from Fuller, 
Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 1960 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 1, and M. POLANYI, THE LoGIC 
OF LIBERTY 170-84 (1951). 
127. The tradition of denying a tradeoff has a clear precedent in the congressional debates over 
the antimerger statutes. See supra text accompanying notes 31-39. 
128. Officials using an economic efficiency standard might have another reason to ignore the 
existence of a tradeoff. They might be unwilling to admit that they decided against challenging a 
merger even though they expected it to lead to higher prices for consumers. 
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Because of its greater complexity, a case-by-case approach is more 
expensive than a rule-based one. Litigation of a complex rule of reason 
case can cost millions of dollars and take years, especially with appeals, 
to establish the ultimate legality of a transaction. Uncertainty over the 
legal status of a merger also raises other costs. Any firm whose merger 
was challenged would have to allow for the possibility of a forced divesti-
ture. This possibility makes planning more expensive. Uncertainty over 
the legality of a class of potential mergers makes long-term planning 
more costly for all firms, both those considering acquisitions and those 
anticipating having to react to others' mergers. 129 The intractability of 
the tradeoff for litigation has led most leading antitrust scholars to argue 
against even attempting to balance market power and efficiency in indi-
vidual mergers. 130 In short, the costs associated with merger litigation 
and the uncertainty it produces would be likely to exceed any expected 
benefits of case-by-case analysis. 131 
129. Merger policy analysis generally focuses on two types of error that the enforcement 
agencies and courts may make. They may prevent beneficial mergers (Type 1 error) or permit 
undesirable mergers (Type 2 error). We have previously introduced the terminology of Type 3 error 
to summarize the generally overlooked administrative, planning, litigation, and other hidden costs of 
overly subjective and unpredictable antitrust enforcement. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 5, at 
1670-77. For a formal analysis, see Fisher & Sciacca, supra note 60, at 72-75. Indeed, a prominent 
attorney who regularly handles Hart-Scott-Rodino filings confessed to one of the authors that his 
clients sometimes propose questionable mergers with the intention of abandoning the effort if the 
antitrust enforcers issue a second request or pose serious concerns. For some relatively small 
transactions, the projected gains (given the purchase price) are less than the cost of complying with a 
second request. Even for larger transactions, the expected gains may not outweigh the out-of-pocket 
and uncertainty costs of the litigative process. 
130. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 5, at 1651-59, for discussion and citations to Bork, Posner, 
Easterbrook, and other scholars. The major exceptions are Areeda and Turner, who would make 
the conditions so strict that virtually no merger could qualify, P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 
5, at 1!1! 939-962, and the Reagan administration's policy of considering anticipated efficiency gains 
in every close merger decision, see, e.g., 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 23, at § 3.5. 
In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 347 U.S. 321, 371 (1963), the most recent 
Supreme Court decision to address the tradeoff explicitly in a merger context-admittedly now 
old-the Court's conclusion is consistent with our view. The Court concluded that balancing 
"economic debits and credits ... [was] beyond the ordinary limits of judicial competence ..•• " See 
also United States v. Rice Growers Ass'n of California, 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1!67.287, at 61,467 
(rejecting a motivation to modernize at the lowest possible cost as a defense for an otherwise 
anticompetitive merger). For a more thorough discussion of the ability of courts to assess efficiency 
effects, see Fisher & Lande, supra, at 1656-59; see also Bork, supra note 7 (discussing the difficulties 
that arise when courts attempt case-by-case economic analysis of mergers). For extensive citations 
and a discussion of problems with the rule of reason approach in the related context of nonprice 
vertical restrains, see Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 135, 153-57 (1984). 
131. Any logical rule would permit mergers whose net benefit under the legislative criteria 
would probably be positive and disallow cases whose net social benefit would probably be negative. 
Remaining cases would tend to be those about which reasonable experts would disagree and/or cases 
whose expected net social benefit would be close to zero. For a detailed analysis, see Fisher & 
Lande, supra note 5, at 1651-77; for a formalization, see Fisher & Sciacea, supra note 60, at 72-75. 
Judge (then Professor) Easterbrook expressed a similar sentiment in recommending a simple 
screen based on output changes for evaluating the legality of vertical restraints: "F. M. Scherer's 
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C. Recent Enforcement Approaches in Light of Our Findings 
Although price is more workable than economic efficiency as a 
merger standard, we believe that enforcers would be unable to handle 
either reliably on a case-by-case basis. The enforcement system, how-
ever, can incorporate the required efficiency gains implicitly, on average, 
rather than in individual cases. Of course, one could make exceptions in 
rare cases if truly significant merger-specific efficiency gains seemed vir-
tually certain. However, as the 1982 Merger Guidelines recognized, one 
should apply the exceptions cautiously. 132 
When the Department revised its enforcement approach for mergers 
in the early 1980s, it recognized that a case-by-case efficiency defense 
would be a litigation uightmare. The Department did not, however, have 
any basis to challenge the arguments of those who argued that decreases 
demonstration that the output test could be inaccurate in some cases does not affect the point. If 
these cases are sufficiently rare, as his own analysis suggests they will be, then the output filter still 
has value. We are searching for useful filters, not perfect ones." Easterbrook, supra note 109, at 31 
n.64 (citation omitted). 
132. For example, LTV Corp.'s 1984 acquisition of Republic Steel seemed to offer clear 
efficiency potential, particularly since LTV had previously obtained significant' cost reductions from 
its 1978 acquisition of Lykes Corporation's Youngstown Steel. See, e.g., Loomis, U.S. Steel and 
LTV Find Hidden Charms in Losers, FoRTUNE, Mar. 5, 1984, at 118, which 'states that the Lykes 
acquisition lowered LTV's average cost of making steel by about $15 a ton and predicts similar 
results from the Republic acquisition. Indeed, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust J. Paul 
McGrath approved the acquisition, overruling his staff's recommendation, in part because of 
anticipated efficiency gains: 
[I]n the LTV-Republic merger, there was very persuasive evidence that the combined 
operation of several plants could have, and indeed should have, and probably would have 
resulted in substantial cost savings .... [W]e certainly did conclude, at least as to that one 
part of the efficiency claim, that the evidence was very clear, very convincing, and certainly 
up to anyone's standards. 
McGrath Statement, supra note 3, at 141-42. 
The Republic acquisition, however, turned out to be "Disasterville," with customer desertion, 
computer snafus, poor employee morale, and major underestimates of the time required to consoli-
date operations sufficiently to reduce operating costs. See, e.g., Why LTV Is Stymied in Steel, Bus. 
Wk. 65, Apr. 1985, at 65; O'Boyle & Russell, Troubled Marriage: Steel Giants' Merger Brings Big 
Headaches, J&L and Republic Find, Wall St. J., Nov. 30, 1984, at 1, col. 6. Largely because of the 
merger, LTV filed for proteetion under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy code on July 17, 1986. 
Beazley & Russel, LTV Chapter 11 Filing Will Change the Way Steel Mills Compete, Wall St. J., July 
18, 1986, at 1, col. 6. 
Although LTV eventually achieved cost savings from the merger, these benefits apparently rep-
resented wealth transfers rather than true efficiency gains. Indeed, under bankruptcy protection, 
LTV was able to transform itself into the "most efficient of the nation's major steelmakers." Chapter 
11's Safe Harbor Has Its Shoals, Wall St. J., Apr. 15, 1987, at 2, col. 2. It shifted "massive unfunded 
pension liabilities" to the federal Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., thereby making that agency insol-
vent. It also escaped from long-term contracts that had foreed it to accept iron ore and coal at prices 
well above market levels. These cost reductions enabled LTV to reduce its pre-tax cost of making 
and shipping steel from around $460 to $380 a ton and to become the lowest cost major U.S. steel 
manufacturer. I d. The Supreme Court has agreed to decide whether the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corp. may require that LTV Corp. reassume funding responsibility for the $2.3 billion shortfall in its 
pension plans. Wermiel, High Court to Rule on Whether LTV Should Fund $2.3 Billion Pension 
Gap, Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1989, at A3, col. 2. 
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in marginal costs of as little as I% to 2% would offset virtually all the 
adverse effects of anticompetitive mergers. 133 Our model building pro-
vides this evidence. We demonstrate that in the relevant context of non-
collusive oligopoly, the decrease in marginal costs necessary to keep price 
from rising is probably far greater than previous authors had believed. 
Efficiency gains of 0 to 9% would be required to ensure that mergers of 
the size that the enforcement agencies routinely evaluate would not lead 
to higher prices. 
These calculations, however, depend critically on the probability of 
collusion. The price-increasing effects of collusion are far more signifi-
cant than the effects of increased concentration among independently 
operating oligopolists. When a merger makes collusion sigriificantly 
more likely, the required cost reductions could increase substantially, 
perhaps to several times as much, to levels far in excess of the efficiency 
gains that one could realistically anticipate from a merger. 
Our specific results assume the price standard. With economic effi-
ciency as the criterion, the required decreases in marginal costs would be 
smaller. Because the economic efficiency standard is vastly more com-
plex to model, we cannot directly compare our results to those that an 
efficiency standard could imply. However, guidelines relying on a price 
standard would by definition permit fewer mergers than guidelines rely-
ing on an efficiency test. 134 
To the extent that the government used economic efficiency as the 
sole basis for the HHI standards in the Merger Guidelines-or for 
whatever standards it currently follows 135-the thresholds are too high. 
Ideal merger guidelines would use a price standard and incorporate the 
average effects of mergers on marginal costs and the probability of 
anticompetitive behavior as a result of increased concentration. They 
133. Our finding of much larger required efficiency gains represents a combination of our using 
price rather than economic efficiency as a merger standard, our constructing explicit oligopoly 
models rather than using a more ad hoc approach, and our having access to actual data on HHI 
levels and changes for mergers that firms are actually proposing. For the arguments that efficiency 
gains of 1% to 2% would be sufficient, see supra notes 5 and 43. 
134. The price standard permits mergers unlikely to result in higher prices. An economic 
efficiency standard would permit the same mergers and also allow mergers likely to lead to higher 
prices, as long as the mergers were substantially likely to generate sufficient efficiency gains. For a 
diagrammatic explanation of the difference between the two standards, see supra Figure 1 and 
accompanying text. 
135. Enforcement standards during the last few years of the Reagan Administration were more 
lenient than those in the Merger Guidelines. See, e.g., Krattenmaker & Pitofsky, Antitrust Merger 
Policy and the Reagan Administration, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 211, 226-32 (1988). The authors 
conclude that there has been a "[d]e facto doubling of the HHI standards .... " Id. at 228. See also 
Conference Board Seminar, supra note 23 (discussing Ira Millstein's view that the Reagan 
administration used secret merger guidelines), and supra note 80 (demonstrating that HHI levels and 
changes in challenged cases have been substantially above the Merger Guideline thresholds). 
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would also reflect Congress' desire to interdict anticompetitive develop-
ments in their incipiency. 136 
The National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) treats effi-
ciency gains most consistently with the results of our modeling. The 
NAAG considers increases in efficiency only for mergers of modest size 
in moderately concentrated markets with postmerger HHis less than 
1800.137 Our simulation results suggest that any market power effects of 
mergers near the Guideline trigger (a postmerger HHI level of 1800 and 
an increase of 100) usually require only modest efficiency gains to keep 
price from rising (especially if collusion would not be a major threat at 
these HHI levels). In contrast, mergers that result in much higher HHI 
levels or larger changes often require extensive savings in marginal 
costs-frequently much larger than one could expect from any merger, 
and certainly larger than one could predict reliably in advance. 
The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, 
however, still dominate merger enforcement, and they have shifted in 
recent years from a rule-oriented to a more subjective, rule of reason 
approach, 138 based primarily on an efficiency rather than a price 
standard. 139 Defendants' attorneys now routinely present the govern-
ment with efficiency arguments designed to justify mergers that they 
would not have proposed before the mid-1980s. 140 The government has 
permitted some mergers at levels significantly above the Guideline 
thresholds, in whole or in part because of anticipated efficiency gains. 141 
However, neither the Department nor the Commission has specified by 
how much a merger must be likely to reduce marginal costs to offset a 
presumption of illegality. 
136. Since these factors go beyond the scope of our paper, we do not suggest how ideal HHI 
standards would differ from the levels in the Merger Guidelines or any implicit standards that the 
enforcement agencies may now be using. 
137. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. Moreover, because the NAAG Guidelines 
incorporate wealth transfer concerns, they are logically somewhat stricter than the federal standards. 
We do not address the workability of the NAAG Guidelines. 
138. The courts have also been moving toward rule of reason in other aspects of antitrust, such 
as vertical restraints and horizontal restraints. See, e.g., Gellhorn & Tatham, Making Sense Out of 
the Rule of Reason, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 155 (1985) (giving examples where per se standards 
have given way to rule of reason or other types of more involved analysis). 
139. However, in practice the administration may sometimes use or advocate a price standard. 
See, e.g., supra notes 3, 50-51; supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
140. For example, in In re American Medical Int'l, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1 (1984), the Commission 
discussed two possible geographic market definitions and two different units of measurements. The 
acquiring firm's market share was between 52.2 and 57.8%; the acquired firm's share, between 19.1 
and 29.2%. The postmerger HHI was between 5507 and 7775, and the change was between 1989 
and 3405. /d. at 201. Compare Table 1 and text accompanying supra notes 79-80 with 1984 Merger 
Guidelines, supra note 23, at§ 3.11; 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 21, at§ III.A.l. 
141. See supra note 132 and Table 1. 
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The myriad of complexities in each proposed merger makes it 
unlikely that courts or agencies could balance efficiency against market 
power accurately in individual cases. At least in theory, researchers 
could examine past above-Guideline mergers to evaluate whether the 
predicted cost savings and quality enhancements have indeed arisen and 
compensated for allocative efficiency or price effects. But even if research 
were able to show that the courts and agencies were performing the bal-
ancing correctly in a majority of cases, the case-by-case approach of 
recent years is probably creating enormous uncertainty costs for busi-
nesses. Estimating the impact of the subjective rule of reason approach 
on business planning and transaction costs would be far more difficult 
than evaluating whether the courts and agencies have been performing 
the balancing correctly. We expect, however, that case-by-case balancing 
would not generate enough net gain to outweigh the costs of an overly 
subjective enforcement policy.142 For that reason, we believe that it 
would be more effective to incorporate anticipated efficiency gains 
directly, but implicitly, into the merger standards. 
142. To use our terminology, see supra note 129, we believe that Type 3 error costs would 
exceed any net gains in the sum of Types 1 and 2 error. For an example of the difficulty in avoiding 
Types 1 and 2 error in individual mergers, see supra note 132. 
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APPENDIX A 
A "THEORETICALLY NEUTRAL" APPROACH 
FOR EVALUATING THE TRADEOFF 
819 
The model building in this Appendix underlies the material in sec-
tion IV.C. We use assumptions and models as general as possible to 
address the question of how much a merger must reduce marginal costs 
to offset the market power inherent in a merger in an oligopoly com-
prised of noncolluding firms. 143 
Assume that a firm chooses a level of output (x *) such that marginal 
revenue (MR) equals marginal cost (MC) at that output. Conceptually, 
with no change in industry demand, an increase in market power for a 
firm implies a downward shift in the firm's MR curve. All else equal, the 
new intersection of the MR and MC curves would lie to the left of the 
initial intersection and imply a lower level of output and, consequently, a 
higher price to consumers. To calculate the new output, one would have 
to know the shapes of both the MC and the new MR curves over their 
relevant ranges-a formidable informational requirement. 
Fortunately, our characterization of the problem minimizes the 
information necessary to determine the effects of a merger. We want to 
know how great efficiency gains would have to be to offset any price 
effects of a merger. Equivalently, how much would the MC curve have 
to shift down to intersect the new MR curve at the initial output level 
x*? This formulation narrows our focus. We need compare equilibrium 
conditions only at output x *; we do not need to know anything about the 
rest of the MR or MC curves. Our results therefore generalize over all 
possible combinations of MC and MR curves whose intersection at x * is 
consistent with profit maximization. 
Nevertheless, one large informational problem remains. How does a 
firm perceive its MR, and how does this perception change with a 
merger? To answer this question, we assume a market of n firms produc-
ing a homogeneous product, and no prospect of new entry.144 Marginal 
revenue for a typical firm is: 
143. One might use "model" for two distinct meanings relevant to this Appendix: the nature of 
firms' conjectures and the way their conjectures change in response to a merger. To avoid this 
potential confusion, we use "assumptions" when discussing the first meaning and "model" when 
discussing the second. We also use "model building" to describe the entire process of developing 
integrated models and assumptions to describe a market. 
144. When entry is quick and easy, the market will eliminate any antitrust problems. In words 
that should be immortal, Senator Sherman, who introduced the Sherman Act, stated: "[I]f other 
corporations can be formed on equal terms a monopoly is impossible." 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (I 890). 
820 
(1) 
p 
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MR; = P [1 + (1 + k ;) ], where 
is price, 
is firm i's market share, 0< s; < 1, 
is the industry's price elasticity of demand, (1'] < 0), 
and 
is firm i's conjectural variatiqn, 145 where 
That is, firm i's conjectural variation is the sum of 
the changes in output by all other firms (each firm i 
such that j is different from i) for a given change in 
firm i's output. 
Suppose that firms I and 2 merge. Their new MR becomes: 
(2) MR' = P [1 + (1 + k') ], 
where k' is the merged firm's conjectural variation. 
The parameters in equations (1) and (2) are fairly straightforward to 
estimate, with the exception of the conjectural variations k and k '. There 
is no general consensus in the literature on the numerical values of con-
jectural variations in oligopolistic situations, although economists fre-
quently use two rather extreme values for computational simplicity. 
Cournot assumptions are that the merged firm anticipates no output 
response from its competitors (k=0). 146 Competitive assumptions are the 
145. To simplify the presentation, we treat k, as a constant. More generally, k 1 may vary with 
x,. For our analysis, it is immaterial whether k1 be a constant or a function of output, because we 
examine changes in MR at a single level of output, not over a range of outputs. 
146. Salant, Switzer, & Reynolds, Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous 
Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium, 98 Q.J. EcoN. 185 (1983), demonstrate 
that in a Coumot model with constant MC, no two firms would have an incentive to merge as long 
as there were three or more price-searching firms in the industry. Intuitively, in that situation the 
gains from the increase in market power would all go to the nonmerging firms. These results raise 
the question of the legitimacy of a Coumot model for simulating merger behavior. Perry & Porter, 
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opposite, that the merged firm anticipates complete and exactly offsetting 
output responses (k= -1). Except under competitive conditions, firms 
in otherwise similar circumstances would normally be unlikely to have 
similar conjectural variations, since these parameters are primarily sub-
jective phenomena (surmises). Hence, it would be unrealistic to argue for 
any particular value of k as a general case. Instead, we examine conjec-
tural variations over the entire range from competitive to Cournot (- 1 
~ k ~ 0) and report the range of outcomes. 
We must still model how firms change their conjectural variations 
(from k to k 1) when they merge. There are two parts to this question. 
First, how do the merging firms' perceptions of k change? Second, how 
do the remaining firms in the industry alter their own perceptions? We 
assume that the remaining firms do not change their actions or percep-
tions as long as the merging firms do not alter their combined output. 
This assumption is consistent with the initial vector of industry outputs 
being a Nash equilibrium. 147 
We consider four separate models of how k for the merging firms 
changes after the merger. In each of these models, 0 2:. k 1 > k. 
Model A: k 1 = k 1• The simplest model is that k does not change at 
all. 
Model B: k 1 = k 1 (1 - s 1 - s 2) I (1 - s 1). This relationship 
follows from a model in which a firm's conjectural 
variations are proportional to the percentage of the market 
that it does not control. 
(i) k1 - a(l - s1); 
(ii) k 1 - a (1 - s1 - s2) 
= k1 (1 - s1 - s2) I (1 - s1) 
Model C: k 1 = k 1 (HHI - s 12 - s 22) I (1 - s 12). This model is 
similar to Model B, except here k is proportional to the 
sum of squared shares of the other firms in the market. 
Model D: k 1 = k (n- 2)1(n -1 ), where n is the number of firms in 
the industry before the merger. In this model, the firms' 
shares do not matter. Instead, k changes as the number of 
firms changes. 
Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger, 75 AM. EcoN. REV. 219 (1985), relax the 
assumption of coustant MC and show that merger can be profitable in a Cournot model with more 
than two firms. Our simulations make no assumptions about the shape of the MC curves because 
our concern is only with how much MC would have to decline at a specified output level. 
147. See supra note 95. 
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For any given model and initial value for k, we can compare the 
bracketed terms in equations {1) and {2) for each of the merging firms 
and calculate the percentage decrease in each firm's MR at its initial out-
put level. 148 
(3) %•MR; - 100 [ (MR' - MR;) I MR; ] 
= 100 _(.;_s _1 +_s---'2)_{_1_+_k_')_-_s_i _(l_+_k_i)_ 
'I') + Si (l+k;) 
If their MC's decrease by the same percentage, the merging firms will 
maintain their initial levels of production. Therefore, equation {3) also 
determines the magnitude of efficiency gains necessary to offset exactly 
the price effects of a merger. 
Equation (3) demonstrates that the percentage decrease in marginal 
costs necessary to keep output from falling (price from increasing) 
depends on conjectural variations (the specific oligopoly model), the mar-
ket shares of the merging firms, and the elasticity of demand. The shares 
of the merging firms directly translate into the change in the HHI, which 
equals 2(100s I)(lOOs2). 
I48. MR always decreases as a result of a merger when k' 2::. k and may decrease when k' < k. 
A decline in MR implies that the term %•MR in equation (3) is negative. The denominator is 
negative whenever MR is positive (see equation (I)), as would clearly be true at the profit-
maximizing level of output x*, given positive MC. Similarly, the numerator is positive, since 
(s1 + Sz) Is, > I fori = I,2, and 
I 2::. (I + k1) I (I + k'), 
since k' 2::. k 1• Hence, MR<O. 
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APPENDIX B 
TRADEOFFS FOR MARKET STRUCTURE CHANGES: 
COMPETITION TO OLIGOPOLY AND OLIGOPOLY TO MONOPOLY 
In this Appendix, we derive the decreases in marginal costs neces-
sary to keep prices from rising under three scenarios: competitive to 
Coumot, Coumot to monopolistic, and competitive to monopolistic. 
These proofs underlie the calculations in sections IV.C and IV.D. The 
most convenient assumption is that both cost and price changes occur for 
the entire industry. If we assumed instead that the efficiency gains 
accrued only for the merging firms and the price rises occurred for all 
firms, the required decreases in marginal costs would be greater. How-
ever, because this scenario implies significant cost differences among 
firms in the same market, the situation would not represent a stable 
equilibrium. 149 
Once we have determined the decreases in marginal costs necessary 
to keep prices from increasing, we can use that information to derive the 
critical elasticities of demand for which price would increase by exactly x 
percent if the firms colluded. Details of the proof depend on the exact 
specification of the demand function. We illustrate the process with a 
proof for constant elasticity of demand and Coumot assumptions, the 
least complex to analyze formally. 150 
The following definitions for subscripts facilitate the proofs: 
s starting condition 
e ending condition 
1 competitive 
2 Coumot 
3 monopolistic 
149. See the caveats supra note 100 and Table 2, note t. 
150. This proof underlies the calculations for supra note 89 and the accompanying text. 
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We also define the following terms: 
P price 
MC marginal cost 
Q industry output 
f, g functions of 
a. proportionate change in price, 0 ~ a.< 1 
100a. percentage change in price 
I 'l'J I absolute value of the elasticity of demand 
hhi HHI/10,000 (thus transformed to decimal) 
R percentage change in MC required to keep P from 
increasing; R=(MCe/MC5)-l 
Firms maximize profits by selecting output where marginal cost 
equals marginal revenue. Different market structures generate changes 
in the relationship between price and marginal revenue, and thus the 
relationship between marginal cost and price. The following relation-
ships are well known from economic theory: 
(1') P1 = MC1 for competitive pricing. 
(2) (Pz - MCz) I Pz = hhill 'l'] I, or 
(2') P2 = MC2 I (1 - hhi!l 'l'] I) for Cournot pricing. 
(3) MC3 = P3 (1 - 111 'l'] !), or 
(3') P3 = MC3 I (1 - 111 'l'J j) for monopolistic pricing. 
We define: 
Suppose that a merger changes the market structure and leads to a 
price increase from P5 to Pe. Since we defined a. as the proportionate 
increase in price (for example, if price increased by 10% then a. would 
equal 0.1 0), then 
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Since we can write price as a function of marginal cost (see equa-
tions (1') through (3')), we can substitute these equations into equation 
(6) to obtain the proportionate change in marginal cost that corresponds 
to the a. increase in price. 
A. Competitive to Cournot 
Suppose that a market goes from competitive to Coumot. Substitut-
ing (2') and (1') into (6) yields: 
(7) M~ I (1 - hhill11 I) = l+a., or 
(8) R = (MC2 I MC,) ....,. 1 = (1+a.) (1 - hhiii11D - 1, 
which shows the proportionate change in MC necessary to make P 
change by a.. To keep price constant, we solve for a. = 0: 
(9) R = - hhi/111 1, for competitive to Coumot. 
B. Cournot to Monopolistic 
Suppose a market goes from Coumot to monopolistic pricing. Sub-
stituting (3') and (2') into (6) yields: 
(10) 
MC2 I (1 - hhill11 I) = 1+a., or 
(11) R = (MC3 I M~) - 1 
= (1+a.) [(1111- 1) I <1111- hhi)] - 1, 
which shows the proportionate change in MC necessary to make P 
change by a.. To keep price constant, we solve for a. = 0: 
(12) R = [(1111 - 1) I <1111 - hhi)] - 1, or 
(13) R = (hhi - 1) I (1111 - hhi), for Coumot to 
monopolistic. 
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C. Competitive to Monopolistic 
Suppose that a merger transforms an industry from competitive to 
monopolistic pricing and also lowers the marginal costs of the remaining 
firm(s). Substituting (3') and (1') into (6) yields: 
(14) MC3 I (1 - 11111 I) = I +a, or 
(15) R = (MC3 I MCt) ~ 1 = (I + a) (1 - 11111 I) - I, 
which shows the proportionate change in MC necessary to make P 
change by a. To keep price constant, we solve for a=O: 
(16) R = (MC3 - MCt) I MCt ..:... - 111111· for competitive 
to monopolistic. 
D. Efficiency Gains for Merging Firms Only 
The proofs so far assume implicitly that all firms in the market 
achieve efficiency gains and all benefit from market power effects. If we 
assumed instead that a merger increased market power for the entire 
industry but lowered costs only for the merging firms, the required 
reductions in marginal cost would be greater. Large cost reductions for 
some but not all firms in an industry would be unstable-the other firms 
would need to obtain major efficiency gains or risk going out of business. 
For this reason, we cannot generally derive a numerical value for the 
marginal cost savings necessary to keep price from rising. 
E. Critical Elasticities of Demand 
Suppose (following note 89) that we have a Cournot market with 
constant elasticity of demand. For what value of I 11 I would price 
increase by exactly x% if the firms colluded? This value of I 11 I is the 
"critical elasticity of demand." 
Equations (2') and (3') give the equilibrium conditions for Coumot 
and monopolistic pricing, respectively. By assumption, in moving from 
(2') to (3'), price has increased by x %. Thus, 
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(17) P3 = P2 (1 + xllOO). 
To find the value I '11* I that enables price to rise by exactly x %, we 
substitute equations (2') and (3') into (17) to obtain: 
(18) R = MC3 I (1 - 111 '11* I) 
= [M~ I (1 - hhi!l '11* I)] [1 + xl100] 
(19) I '11* I = (100 + X - IOOhhi) I x. 
The table below shows the values of the critical elasticities that cor-
respond to various premerger HHis for price increases of 5% and 10%, 
assuming constant elasticity of demand. 
HHI x=lO% x=5% 
0 11 21 
2500 8.5 16 
5000 6 11 
.]500 3.5 6 
